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ABSTRACT
Are people convicted of terrorism-related offenses so dangerous that
we must bend the Constitution to keep the public safe? Or should we treat
them like people who commit other crimes—by prosecuting, convicting,
sentencing, and then releasing them after they have served their criminal
sentences? Can we trust the government to use the power to detain people
without criminal charge without abusing it? The case of Adham Amin
Hassoun raises these questions. Prosecuted after 9/11 for providing
support to Muslims abroad in the 1990s, and sentenced under the United
States’ expansive material support laws, Hassoun avoided a life sentence
only to find that the government never planned to release him regardless
of the sentence he was given. Instead, he became the first person held
under Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which purports to give the
government broad authority to detain non-citizens whom the government
certifies are national security risks. The government abused that authority
in Hassoun’s case. But perhaps more importantly than what happened to
Hassoun himself, his case illustrates the ease with which domestic national
security detention can be abused by government actors with perverse
political incentives. Above all, Hassoun’s case should cause us to
reexamine the traditional deference given to the government in national
security matters, particularly when the government’s targets are from
disfavored groups such as Muslims or other religious and racial minorities.
More than twenty years after 9/11, it is time to interrogate the national
security legal apparatus that rose up in the aftermath of the attacks and
which ensnared Hassoun in a legal battle that only ended after the
government was forced to justify its actions and failed.
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INTRODUCTION
Adham Amin Hassoun was not the most high-profile person to be
convicted for terrorism-related offenses following the 9/11 attacks. That
title might go to Jose Padilla, the so-called “dirty bomber” and Hassoun’s
co-defendant.1 Nor was Hassoun the most high-profile person to finish a
criminal sentence in the post-9/11 era. That would probably be John
Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban,” who was released from custody
in May 2019.2 The conduct for which he was convicted—providing
1. Abby Goodnough, After Five Years, Padilla Goes on Trial in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES (May
15, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/washington/15padilla.html
[https://perma.cc/D62M-TYRH].
2. Niraj Chokshi & Carol Rosenberg, John Walker Lindh, the ‘American Taliban,’ Was
Released. Trump Said He Tried to Stop It, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/05/23/us/john-walker-lindh-american-taliban-released.html [https://perma.cc/S8KZ-Y6D7].
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support to Muslims fighting in conflicts in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Chechnya in the 1990s— involved no plans to attack the United States or
Americans abroad and had no identifiable victims.
Yet, Hassoun would become the test case for the government’s use
of preventative detention on national security grounds in the United States.
In April 2019, Hassoun became the first individual held under a provision
of the USA PATRIOT Act and the second person held under a similar
regulation promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).3
Hassoun’s legal saga, which ended in July 2020 when he was resettled in
Rwanda, is instructive for examining how the government can use these
unprecedented powers and how circumstances where the government is
unconstrained by concerns about due process and the rule of law can lead
to appalling abuse by governmental actors.
Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act, passed by Congress less than
three weeks after the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan, provides
breathtakingly broad power to the government to detain individuals in the
United States.4 It purports to allow the government to detain a non-citizen
indefinitely without criminal charge upon a certification that the individual
poses a risk to national security.5 It does so for individuals who have never
taken up arms against the United States and who have never been on a
battlefield. It collapses the distinction between the Supreme Court’s long
line of cases carefully limiting preventative civil detention and the
government’s expansive war powers overseas. Its widespread use
would—at least for non-citizens—swallow the criminal justice system
whole.
This is the next chapter of the War on Terror.6 Many of the
individuals who were prosecuted for terrorism-related crimes in the
aftermath of 9/11 are close to finishing their criminal sentences.7 For those
who are non-citizens, deportation may not be an option because they are
stateless, their country of origin will not accept them, or the United States
3. Charlie Savage, Testing Novel Power, Trump Administration Detains Palestinian After
Sentence Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/us/politics/adhamhassoun-indefinite-detention.html [https://perma.cc/Y6HW-9J7R].
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2020).
5. Id. § 1226a(a)(3).
6. President George W. Bush first coined the term “War on Terror” to describe the fight against
Al Qaeda after the September 11 attacks, but it has come to refer to the global fight against Islamic
extremism writ large. See Transcript of President Bush’s Address, CNN (Sept. 20, 2001),
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript [https://perma.cc/ML4K-9J2C] (“Our war
on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”).
7. For a summary of all terrorism prosecutions in the U.S. since 9/11, see Terrorism Prosecution
Database, CTR. FOR NAT’L SEC. AT FORDHAM LAW, https://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org/
terrorism-database [https://perma.cc/6HTV-RJCB].
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cannot remove them under the Convention Against Torture.8 The
government will have to make choices about what to do with such
individuals. The USA PATRIOT Act is one arrow in its quiver. The related
regulation promulgated after the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v.
Davis is another.9
Hassoun’s case illustrates just how dangerous these detention
authorities are. The government detained Hassoun for sixteen months
based on anonymous jailhouse informants recounting double and triple
hearsay about what Hassoun was allegedly planning to do if he was
released into the United States.10 The government argued that it had no
obligation to present any evidence whatsoever to prove these allegations
and that the court had no role in reviewing the certification or its
underlying factual allegations that Hassoun posed a national security risk.
After it lost this argument, the government abandoned its case on the eve
of trial and conceded that it could not prove that Hassoun was dangerous.
During the course of those sixteen months, the government’s main
witness was outed as a crook and serial liar who had fabricated the
allegations against Hassoun. The government accused Hassoun of
threatening a witness and then deleted video evidence that could have
exonerated him. The government’s other witnesses were discredited or
rejected as unreliable by the court, leaving the government with only one
witness willing to recount a single conversation with Hassoun to support
the government’s allegation that he was dangerous. The Court eventually
awarded sanctions against the government for hiding exculpatory
evidence.
After realizing that it was going to lose, the government mooted out
the case by making a deal with Rwanda to accept Hassoun, then convinced
the Second Circuit to vacate the district court’s decision.11 Hassoun is now
free, but the next individual detained under these authorities will not be so
lucky. The government may now feel emboldened to use its authority to
detain anyone convicted of a terrorism offense after they have served their
sentence, even if the factual predicate for the detention is flimsier than the
case against Hassoun. If the government decides to interpret “national
security” and “terrorism” broadly, it could sweep in many non-citizens
who cannot be deported, rendering moot the Supreme Court’s carefully
cabined exceptions to the general rule against preventative detention.12
8. The Convention Against Torture contains a non-refoulement obligation that has no recognized
exceptions. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment as modified, UN Doc A/139/51, art. 3 (1984).
9. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d).
10. See infra Section IV.C.
11. Hassoun v. Searls, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020).
12. See infra Part II.
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Even if courts eventually reject this argument, the government can hold
people for months or years under these authorities, then moot out the case
if it appears it will lose.
I was one of Hassoun’s attorneys and can speak firsthand to the ways
in which the government abused its authority in his case.13 Hassoun’s story
should serve as a warning to anyone who worries about preserving
individual freedoms and shows clearly that the government cannot be
trusted to use national security detention judiciously. Indeed, it may be the
paradigmatic case for illustrating why the rule against preventative
detention remains a necessity. In the absence of court intervention,
Congress must step in.
In this Article, I will first tell the story of Adham Hassoun and detail
how he became the test case for a new kind of national security detention.
I will then explore the history of civil detention more generally in the
United States and the Supreme Court’s attempts to limit it. Then I will turn
to the USA PATRIOT Act and the related regulation before looking at
how these authorities were utilized in Hassoun’s case. Finally, I will draw
lessons from Hassoun’s case to make the case that allowing national
security detention is dangerous and that Congress should abolish it.
I. BACKGROUND
It is not typical in landmark cases raising important constitutional
issues to focus on the stories of the individuals involved, but I choose to
do so here for several reasons.14 First, it would be very easy for readers to
dismiss Hassoun as a terrorist and approach his legal case through that
lens. Indeed, that is what the USA PATRIOT Act allows the government
to do. But Hassoun’s story is illustrative of the dangers of reducing people
to stereotypes. He was convicted of terrorism-related offenses but his story
is far more complex than that fact would suggest. Second, understanding
Hassoun’s story is important to understanding the War on Terror itself:
from society’s under reaction in the 1990s to its overreaction after 9/11,

13. I began representing Hassoun in August 2018 when I was a clinical professor at the
University at Buffalo School of Law, together with my husband and colleague, Jonathan Manes. I later
moved to the University of Chicago Law School and he moved to the MacArthur Justice Center at
Northwestern Law School. We were also joined, as co-counsel, by the national American Civil
Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union in April 2019. There were generations of
clinical students who assisted on this case: Erin Barry, Colton Kells, Sam Winter, Jesslyn Zailac, Kerri
Bejger, Marline Paul, Emily Staebell, Andrew Kij, Richard Barney, Naphtalie Librun-Ukiri, Brian
Zagrocki, and Samantha Becci.
14. I would like to thank one of my law professors, the late Drew Days, Alfred M. Rankin
Professor of Law at Yale Law School and former Solicitor General of the United States, for teaching
me that understanding the story behind a case is often just as important as understanding the doctrinal
significance of the holding.
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and the way the world has come to view that overreaction in the years
since.
My purpose here is not to disprove all of the allegations against
Hassoun. That would be an impossible project and pointless, given that a
jury convicted him of three terrorism-related offenses. Instead, I hope to
complicate the picture that the government has painted about who he is; to
humanize him; and ultimately, to convince you that the government
abused its power to detain him on national security grounds after he served
his criminal sentence.15
A. Hassoun’s Early Life
Adham Amin Hassoun was born in Beirut, Lebanon on April 20,
1962 to Palestinian parents who had fled Haifa, currently within Israel’s
borders, during the 1948 Arab-Israel War.16 Like all Palestinian refugees
born in Lebanon, he was not eligible for Lebanese citizenship. In order to
have a right to remain in Lebanon, Hassoun’s parents would have had to
register with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the
United Nations (UN) agency that supports the relief and human
development of Palestinian refugees.17 For reasons that remain unclear,
they failed to do so, although they did register with the Red Cross.18 His
parents’ failure to register effectively barred Mr. Hassoun from ever
gaining refugee status in Lebanon.19 From Lebanon’s perspective,
Hassoun had no legal right to be in the country.
Life in Beirut was difficult for Hassoun. In 1975, when Hassoun was
thirteen, the Lebanese civil war between the ruling Maronite Christian
government and a coalition of Palestinian and Muslim forces broke out.
Over 150,000 people were killed during the 15-year conflict,20 which
extended all the way through Hassoun’s adolescence and early adulthood.
Hassoun did not participate in the fighting, but the conflict touched his life
in many ways. As a teenager, he and some friends converted a car into a
makeshift ambulance to take wounded individuals to the hospital.
15. As one of Hassoun’s attorneys, I am privy to some information that is protected by
confidentiality and that I will not disclose here. Hassoun has consented to allow me to write this Article
based on publicly available documents and news reports.
16. Declaration of Adham Amin Hassoun ¶ 2–4, Hassoun v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-586-FPG
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019), ECF No. 29-1 [hereinafter First Hassoun Dec.].
17. United Nations Relief and Works Agency, https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are
[https://perma.cc/9HLB-A58J]; Declaration of Ardi Imseis ¶ 6, Hassoun v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-586FPG, ECF No. 29-3.
18. First Hassoun Dec., supra note 16, ¶ 5.
19. Declaration of Ardi Imseis, supra note 17, ¶ 10.
20. Josh Wood, After 2 Decades, Scars of Lebanon’s Civil War Block Path to Dialogue, N.Y.
TIMES (July 11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/world/middleeast/after-2-decadesscars-of-lebanons-civil-war-block-path-to-dialogue.html [https://perma.cc/VE75-HHLP].
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In 1982, when Hassoun was twenty years old, a militia associated
with a Christian far-right party, Phalange, raided a Palestinian refugee
camp near where Hassoun lived and massacred all of the inhabitants,
allegedly to clear out Palestinian fighters who had taken up residence in
the camp.21 In a span of two days, 1,300 or more civilians were massacred
in plain sight of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).22 Hassoun assisted in the
recovery of bodies from the wreckage. Shortly afterwards, his father was
detained by the Lebanese military and held incommunicado for eight
months.23
Throughout this period, Hassoun became acutely aware of his
Muslim identity and his status as a religious minority. He developed a
strong belief that Muslims had to stand up for each other, and that he
personally had an obligation to help other members of the Muslim
community. He continued his education at the American University of
Beirut, but his studies were interrupted by civil warfare. In 1986, Hassoun
was himself detained for four days and tortured by Shiite militia forces.24
Hassoun went into hiding shortly afterwards, escaping first to Dubai, then
to Cyprus, then back to Dubai until he could apply for a visa to come to
the United States.
Hassoun arrived in Miami, Florida on September 10, 1989, on a
tourist visa. He then applied for a student visa to get a master’s degree at
Novia Southeastern University in Miami in computer science. By that
time, his mother had obtained permanent residency, and in 1990, she filed
a petition to sponsor him for a green card.25
By all outward appearances, Hassoun continued to integrate into
American life. He married his wife, Naheed, in 1991 and had three sons in
1992, 1994, and 2000.26 He moved into a small house with his brother in
a residential neighborhood in Sunrise, Florida, next door to his sister, who
had also immigrated to the United States. After finishing school, he got a
job as a computer programmer at MarCom Technologies, a small software
firm.
At his sentencing years later, twelve MarCom employees, including
his boss, provided letters on his behalf. The letters portrayed him as

21. First Hassoun Dec., supra note 16, ¶ 8; BAYAN NUWAYHED, SABRA AND SHATILA:
SEPTEMBER 1982 3 (2004).
22. NUWAYHED, supra note 21, at 287 (2004). Historians have called into question whether there
were not, in fact, thousands of Palestinian fighters left in the camp at the time of the attack, but rather
several dozen. Id. at 305.
23. First Hassoun Dec., supra note 16, ¶ 9.
24. Id. ¶ 14.
25. Id. ¶ 14–16.
26. Id. ¶ 17.
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“hardworking,” “dedicated,” “honest,” and a “trustworthy employee.”27
Personally, he was described as “considerate and compassionate,” a “loyal
friend,” “a man of his word,” and “a man I always stated would give you
the last $5.00 he had.”28 He was also very involved in his community.
Friends wrote that he “help[ed] people in need regardless of their race,
color, or social background” and was “always willing to go out of his way
to help anyone, Muslim or not.”29 Others relayed instances in which
Hassoun helped families who were struggling financially with food and
rent money.30 Hassoun would come to love the United States during this
time, he would later explain in court documents.31
The government would later describe this phase of Hassoun’s life
very differently, painting him as a radicalized extremist who was
recruiting and raising money for terrorist groups around the globe.
According to court documents, the government began an investigation into
an alleged Al Qaeda terrorist cell in South Florida in 1993, which
expanded to include Hassoun in 1994. Through wiretaps obtained under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),32 the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) gathered evidence of what they believed was an active
terrorist cell run by members of the Majid al-Iman Mosque in Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida, including Hassoun.33 Despite the government’s
suspicions, however, he was not arrested.34
In the mid-1990s, Hassoun’s life in the United States took a turn. His
student visa expired in 1996, but the government had not yet approved his
green card.35 Hassoun became impatient with the delay and contacted the
Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) multiple times and asked why
it had not been approved yet. The INS sat on the application, presumably
because of the pending criminal investigation. During these years,

27. Exhibit 20, Hassoun v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-586-FPG (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019), ECF No. 2926 (Letters of Support Filed in Criminal Case).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Exhibit 1, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69 (W.D.N.Y.), order vacated, appeal
dismissed, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 248-1 [hereinafter Second Hassoun
Dec.].
32. 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq.
33. Greg Allen, Prosecution Plays Bin Laden Tape at Padilla Trial, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June
27, 2007), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11478149 [https://perma.cc/9RB4J8KJ].
34. Man Tied to Bomb Suspect Is Arrested, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/16/world/man-tied-to-bomb-suspect-is-arrested.html
[https://perma.cc/55UB-P7CF].
35. Feds Tie Expired Visa to Associate of ‘Dirty Bomb’ Suspect, CNN (June 16, 2002),
https://www.cnn.com/2002/US/06/16/padilla.associate/index.html [https://perma.cc/ULL3-HFRV].
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Hassoun continued to work at MarCom while he waited for a decision on
his green card application.
B. The September 11 Attacks and Their Aftermath
On September 11, 2001, everything changed for both the world and
Hassoun. The FBI initially focused its response on the direct perpetrators
of the attacks in a sweeping investigation called “PENTTBOM.”36
However, the FBI quickly expanded the scope to include investigations of
people who had nothing to do with 9/11.37 Over 1,200 Muslims living in
the United States were picked up between September 2001 and August
2002 for questioning, and some 762 non-citizens were held on
immigration violations pending an investigation into their ties to
terrorism.38 A 2003 report by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector
General described how investigators used immigration violations to hold
Muslims suspected of terrorist ties.39 According to Michael Chertoff, the
Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Criminal Division, “the
Department’s policy was to ‘use whatever means legally available’ to
detain a person linked to the terrorists who might present a threat and to
make sure that no one else was killed.”40
The FBI identified these individuals in a variety of ways, from leads
generated by the 9/11 investigation to tips from “members of the public
suspicious of Arab and Muslim neighbors.”41 The connection of many of
these individuals to the September 11 attacks was tenuous or non-existent.
Many of the tips were clearly motivated by racial or religious profiling.
For example:
• “Shortly before the September 11 attacks, an alien from
[redacted], who worked at a [redacted] struck up a conversation
with a [redacted] who paid for a purchase using an aviationrelated credit card. During the conversation, the alien allegedly
told the [redacted] that he would like to learn how to fly an
airplane. After the September 11 attacks, the [redacted] called
36. J. T. Caruso, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Before the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Defense (Oct.
03, 2001), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/penttbom [https://perma.cc/L4UU9JHX]; Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigations, 9/11 Investigation (PENTTBOM),
https://www2.fbi.gov/pressrel/penttbom/penttbomb.htm [https://perma.cc/V77D-CHHC].
37. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE
TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1 (2003) [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 13.
41. Id. at 15–16.
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the FBI and recounted his conversation with the [redacted]. The
INS subsequently arrested the alien when it determined he was
out of immigration status, and he was considered a September 11
detainee.”42
• “Another alien was arrested, detained on immigration charges,
and treated as a September 11 detainee because a person called
the FBI to report that the [redacted] grocery store in which the
alien worked, ‘is operated by numerous Middle Eastern men, 24
hrs—7 days a week. Each shift daily has 2 or 3 men. . . . Store
was closed day after crash, reopened days and evenings. Then
later on opened during midnight hours. Too many people to run
a small store.’”43
In the interest of national security, the FBI subverted the common
maxim that it is better to let many guilty people go free than to imprison
one innocent man. A risk that a terrorist sympathizer would fall through
the cracks was clearly unacceptable. Instead, “the FBI wanted to be certain
that no terrorist was inadvertently set free” and acted accordingly.44
Hassoun was picked up as part of this operation. On June 12, 2002,
the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force arrested him at his home in Sunrise,
Florida and charged him with overstaying his student visa.45 That day
began an 18-year journey through the American legal system that only
ended when Hassoun was released to Rwanda in July 2020.
At his removal hearing, the immigration judge found Hassoun
removable for overstaying his visa, prompting him to apply for various
forms of relief from removal, including asylum.46 In response, the
government submitted declarations attesting that Hassoun was ineligible
for relief because he had engaged in terrorist activity.47 The immigration
judge agreed. He was ordered removed in December 2002 and his appeal
was dismissed in June 2003.48 At that point, Hassoun could have been
deported. But he was not, presumably because he was stateless and had
nowhere to go. Instead, he languished in detention at the Krome Detention
Center in Miami, Florida, much of the time in solitary confinement.
42. Id. at 16–17.
43. Id. at 17.
44. Id. at 16.
45. Man Tied to Bomb Suspect Is Arrested, supra note 34.
46. See Attachment 1 to Exhibit A at 19, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69 (W.D.N.Y.),
order vacated, appeal dismissed, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 17-2
[hereinafter BIA Decision Dated June 27, 2003]. Hassoun argued that he was not out of status because
he had a pending application for adjustment of status. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
determined that the government had discretion to not pursue removal proceedings, but that Hassoun
had no right to remain. Id. at 23.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id. at 22, 31.
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The Supreme Court had recently decided Zadvydas v. Davis, which
held that the government had to release non-citizens with final orders of
removal after six months if their removal was not reasonably foreseeable.49
Hassoun had filed a habeas petition in 2002 challenging his detention, but
the district court found that the challenge was premature because he had
not been detained for six months post final order of removal.50
Coincidence or not, Hassoun was indicted and moved to criminal custody
on January 13, 2004, six months and twelve days after Hassoun’s order of
removal became final.51
I am not sure why the government only arrested Hassoun after
September 11 even though he had been under investigation for nearly a
decade, but I have two guesses. First, the FBI shifted law enforcement
strategies after the attacks, deciding it “needed to disrupt such persons
from carrying out further attacks by turning its focus to prevention, rather
than investigation and prosecution.”52 The FBI’s suspicions might not
have been enough for an arrest before 9/11, afterwards however, with its
new focus on prevention, Hassoun clearly posed an unacceptable risk.
Secondly, Hassoun had the misfortune of having come into contact
with one of the most well-known figures in the War on Terror—Jose
Padilla. Padilla had been arrested in Chicago one month before Hassoun,
but unlike Hassoun, he was a U.S. citizen and could not be held in
immigration detention.53 Instead, the government initially arrested him at
the airport on a material witness warrant related to a grand jury
investigation in the Southern District of New York.54 Then, two days
before the scheduled hearing on a motion to vacate the warrant, George
W. Bush executed a military order designating him as an enemy combatant
and declaring that he had “engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and
war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international
terrorism that had the aim to cause injury to or adverse effects on the
United States.”55 Publicly, the DOJ accused Padilla of plotting to set off a

49. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
50. Report of Magistrate Judge 3, Hassoun v. Ashcroft, No. 02-cv-23576 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26,
2003), ECF No. 13 (“Any challenge to the post-removal detention is premature at this time.”).
51. Indictment, United States v. Hassoun, No. 0:04-cr-60001-MGC (S.D. Fla. 2008),
ECF No. 1.
52. OIG REPORT, supra note 37, at 13.
53. Donna R. Newman, The Jose Padilla Story, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 39, 40 (2004).
54. Id.
55. The President’s Declaration on José Padilla, FRONTLINE (June 9, 2002),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/tools/prespadilla.html
[https://perma.cc/86XU-FHU8].
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radioactive “dirty bomb” in the United States.56 Padilla quickly became
known as the “dirty bomber.” He was transferred to the Consolidated
Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina and held for three years in
military custody.
Padilla’s detention was challenged in a habeas action, and the Second
Circuit found that detaining him as an enemy combatant was
unconstitutional.57 However, on a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed, finding that Padilla had brought his habeas petition against the
wrong person and had filed it in the wrong court.58 The petition was refiled
in South Carolina, where Padilla was being held.59 The case made its way
up to the Supreme Court again, but the government indicted him on
terrorism charges before the Supreme Court could decide whether to hear
the case.
Throughout this time, the government could have transferred Padilla
into criminal custody at any time. Yet, it appears that they did not have
sufficient evidence to make out a criminal case. When he was finally
indicted, the charges contained no mention of the dirty bomb plot.60 The
government’s detain first, investigate later strategy meant that the
government often had to be creative in holding people until it could build
its case.61
Hassoun had known Padilla in South Florida—they attended the
same mosque—and the government clearly believed Hassoun might be
useful to the investigation. He was picked up a month after Padilla and
was held in immigration detention for two years while Padilla was in
military custody. During this time, Hassoun was interrogated repeatedly
by the FBI about Padilla and other people he knew. At one point, the
government offered him a plea deal if he would testify against his co-

56. James Risen and Philip Shenon, U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/10/national/us-says-it-halted-qaedaplot-to-use-radioactive-bomb.html [https://perma.cc/8X9Q-D3DH].
57. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003).
58. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
59. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 679 (D.S.C. 2005), rev’d, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
60. Eric Lichtblau, In Legal Shift, U.S. Charges Detainee in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
23, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/23/politics/in-legal-shift-us-charges-detainee-interrorism-case.html [https://perma.cc/42XX-CU9Y]; Superseding Indictment, United States v.
Hassoun, No. 0:04-cr-60001-MGC (S.D. Fla. 2008), ECF No. 14.
61. It remains unclear whether there was ever any plot involving a dirty bomb and Padilla. Later
reports suggest that Padilla had gotten the idea from an internet joke and that he had used the plot to
get out of fighting in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida appears to never have taken it seriously. See Adam Taylor,
The CIA Claimed Its Interrogation Policy Foiled a ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot. But It Was Too Stupid to Work,
WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/09/thecia-claimed-its-interrogation-policy-foiled-a-dirty-bomb-plot-but-it-was-too-stupid-to-work
[https://perma.cc/Z2TS-VMMP].
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defendants. He refused. Shortly afterwards and about eight months before
Padilla was charged, Hassoun was indicted.62
C. Hassoun’s Trial and Conviction
The superseding indictment, filed on November 17, 2005, describes
a conspiracy between five individuals, including Padilla and Hassoun and
another individual, Dr. Kifah Jayyousi, a Jordanian American doctor who
had previously been the chief facilities officer for the District of Columbia
(D.C.) public schools.63 The conspiracy purportedly revolved around
funding and recruiting armed Muslim groups in Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Chechnya, and Somalia in the 1990s. The government alleged that
Hassoun was the mastermind of this conspiracy and that he had recruited
Padilla and another man to attend terrorist training camps in the late 1990s.
The indictment also alleged that Hassoun and his co-defendant, Dr.
Jayyousi, had sent checks to various charities and groups that operated in
these areas, and that these charities and groups were fronts for terrorist
organizations.64
The indictment charged three counts that were tried at trial:
conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or main persons in a foreign country;65
provision of material support or resources “knowing or intending that they
are to be used” to murder, kidnap, or main persons in a foreign country;
and conspiracy to provide that material support.66 Importantly, the
government did not charge the defendants with providing material support
to a designated terrorist organization,67 presumably because the
government could not prove that the material support had gone to any
62. Later, the government would argue that Hassoun posed a danger to national security precisely
because he refused to cooperate in the Padilla investigation. See FBI Memorandum Dated February
21, 2019 at 2; Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69 (W.D.N.Y.), order vacated, appeal dismissed,
976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 261-1.
63. Superseding Indictment, supra note 60. The other two charged members of the conspiracy,
Mohammed Youssef and Kassem Daher, had not been apprehended and remained at large. United
States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1091 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011).
64. Some of the charities Hassoun donated to—most notably, the Global Relief Foundation—
were designated as “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the U.S. Department of the Treasury
after 9/11. See Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Department Statement Regarding the
Designation of the Global Relief Foundation (Oct. 18, 2002) (on file with institution). The FBI had
begun an investigation into its financing and support activities prior to 9/11, but it did not become
public knowledge until afterwards. See id.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 956.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to commit offense); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (providing material
support). The indictment also contains several counts against Hassoun only, namely, unauthorized
possession of a firearm, making false statements to the FBI, five counts of perjury related to testimony
Hassoun gave in his removal proceedings, and obstruction of justice. Hassoun was never prosecuted
for these offenses, and they were dismissed by the government in 2012. See Order of Dismissal, United
States v. Hassoun, No. 04-cr-60001-MGC (S.D. Fla. 2008), ECF No. 1411.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
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particular group, including Al Qaida. Instead, the claim was more general:
that the defendants had conspired to kill people abroad and that they
provided funds and personnel in furtherance of that goal.
The trial on the three primary offenses lasted four months. The
opening statements of counsel provided starkly different interpretations of
Hassoun’s conduct. The government connected Hassoun and his codefendants to the global War on Terror:
This case is about the people that provided the material things needed
to support terrorism . . . the defendants were well aware of the
violence that was going on in these conflicts, violence that included
acts of murder, kidnapping and maiming. And armed with this
knowledge, these defendants decided to support these kinds of
violence, to send equipment, money and people who could keep that
kind of violence going . . . . The evidence will be that Islamic
terrorism is a global phenomenon, but it is also one that took root in
our own backyard. This support cell’s planning was done here, its
money was collected here and its recruits came from here. South
Florida is where the story of Hassoun, Jayyousi and Padilla’s support
and recruitment activities started, and this is where we will ask you
to end it.68

Hassoun’s defense attorney portrayed his actions differently—as
being in defense of vulnerable people around the globe who were
themselves victimized by violence.
The evidence will show that what Adham knew about the charities is,
as I’ve told you, that he was giving for assistance and relief. What he
believed about jihad is that it was and is a noble endeavor to aid
embattled Muslims. It is a blessing to do that in the Islamic religion.
He believed that whatever he did he was helping to protect and defend
Muslims against murder. That is not an intent to commit murder. That
is just the opposite . . . . He had nothing to do with Al-Qaeda. He had
nothing to do with the other organizations, this one from Lebanon,
and MAK. He was just a very passionate Muslim trying to help his
people.69

The prosecution and defense did not disagree much on the overt acts
of the alleged conspiracy. Hassoun had written checks to various charities
and individuals; the amounts and the payees of these checks were
undisputed. He had spoken on the phone about providing this support and
the government had recorded those phone calls. He had encouraged Padilla
68. Transcript of Opening Statements on May 14, 2007 at 76 ¶ 12–77 ¶ 7, United States v.
Hassoun, No. 04-cr-60001-MGC (S.D. Fla. 2008).
69. Transcript of Opening Statements on May 14, 2007 at 90 ¶ 13–20, 96:13–18, United States
v. Hassoun, No. 04-cr-60001-MGC (S.D. Fla. 2008).
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to go to the Middle East and he had sent him money there. Hassoun had
spoken of “jihad” and of the religious obligation to help Muslims fighting
for freedom in other countries.
But there was a chasm between how the two sides interpreted the
meaning of what had occurred. The disconnect took two forms: one
temporal, one positional. First, Hassoun was being prosecuted in a post9/11 world for conduct that happened before the attacks.70 The world had
changed so quickly and so drastically that it was hard to remember that it
had changed at all. But changed it had. In the 1990s, Islamic terrorism was
not viewed as a military conflict but as a transnational criminal problem;
not against a global conspiracy, but as a series of acts committed by
particular actors.
Moreover, the conflicts in which Hassoun was allegedly involved
were not, at the time, viewed as skirmishes in a global war but as regional
ethnic conflicts that required humanitarian intervention and aid. As Darryl
Li has written:
[T]here have been two primary ways of characterizing armed
conflicts: localized ethnic wars and a globally threatening militant
Islam. The former, marked by the “post–Cold War,” is presented as
peripheral, regionally confined, and destabilizing in only a distant
sense, producing hordes of hapless victims in need of mercy and
management. While the West may decide to intervene on one side or
another, formally it projects an image of neutrality as a referee or
policeman committed only to lofty values such as humanitarianism.
The latter, framed as “post-9/11,” produces the figure of the terrorist
as the one the world must band together to defeat.71

Before the entire U.S. government reoriented itself to fighting this
purportedly singular enemy, it had fought on the same side for many of
the groups that Hassoun supported. In Afghanistan, the U.S. government
had armed the mujahideen72 and others in the 1980s to fight back the
Soviet invasion of the country, one of the last Cold War proxy conflicts.73
The U.S. intervened militarily in Bosnia and Kosovo on the side of Muslim
minority populations who were been persecuted and killed by the ruling
70. The only conduct that post-dated 9/11 was a single check that Hassoun wrote in November
2001. See Exhibit A at 8:21-25, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69 (W.D.N.Y.), order vacated,
appeal dismissed, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 1-1 (Sentencing Transcript).
71. DARRYL LI, UNIVERSAL ENEMY 5 (2019).
72. A mujahedeen refers to any Muslim “who fight on behalf of the faith or the Muslim
community” but came to refer specifically to Muslims fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Mujahideen, https://www.britannica.com/topic/mujahideen-Islam
[https://perma.cc/7VWD-8Q3J].
73. BRUCE RIEDEL, WHAT WE WON: AMERICA’S SECRET WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, 1979–89, at
99, 126 (2014).
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Serbs. And in Chechnya, the U.S. had condemned Russian aggression in
the region and even met with separatist leaders.74
After 9/11, these Muslim mujahideen became soldiers in the War on
Terror, which colored how the government—and the jury—saw
Hassoun’s support of them. Before 9/11, Al Qaida was best known as the
group responsible for the 1998 bombing at the U.S. embassies in Tanzania
and Kenya.75 That is not to say that the United States did not recognize
Islamic terrorism as a threat; it clearly did. Al Qaida was designated as a
terrorist organization in 1999, and other Islamic groups were designated
before that.76 But while they had attacked U.S. assets, it was not seen as a
domestic U.S. problem, and certainly had not been universalized into a
global war.
The prosecution clearly understood these dynamics. The best
example of how prosecutors used it to their advantage came when they
played a 1997 CNN interview of Osama Bin Laden, in which he discussed
why he had declared jihad against the United States a year earlier.77 In one
of the recorded conversations that was introduced at trial, Hassoun had
discussed the interview, praising bin Laden for resisting U.S. policy in the
Middle East in places like Israel and Lebanon.78
At trial in 2007, this seemed incredibly damning—Hassoun had
praised Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks and
countless other acts of terrorism against the United States. But in 1997,
this future was not yet known. At that point, a year before the embassy
bombings, bin Laden was someone who had declared “war” against the
United States but had not yet marched into battle. And his criticism of U.S.
foreign policy in Israel would have resonated with Hassoun, who had
experienced that injustice firsthand as a child and through his family’s
history as refugees.
This temporal schism caused a second disconnect. If the world was
divided into “us” and “them,” then there could be no definition of “jihad”
74. Matt Vasilogambros, Cory Bennett & Niraj Chokshi, What You Need to Know About
Chechnya, ATLANTIC (Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/whatyou-need-to-know-about-chechnya/438234 [https://perma.cc/5YFW-5K2Q].
75. Andrea Mitchell & Haley Talbot, Two Far-Away Bombings 20 Years Ago Set Off the Modern
Era of Terror, NBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/two-far-awaybombings-20-years-ago-set-modern-era-n898196 [https://perma.cc/58JD-NAGN] (noting that while
the embassy bombings ushered in a new era in the fight against terrorism, few Americans realized it
at the time).
76. Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, https://www.state.gov/foreig
n-terrorist-organizations [https://perma.cc/TX9K-MFJW].
77. Transcript, CNN Interview with Osama Bin Laden, FINDLAW (March 1997),
http://www.crono911.net/docs/Arnett1997.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JW8-DTEH].
78. Abby Goodnough, Old Bin Laden Interview Is Allowed Into Padilla’s Trial, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/22/washington/22padilla.html
[https://perma.cc/JY3Y-XU4C].
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that did not equate to a declaration of war against the United States. And
when Hassoun undertook acts in support of jihad, it could only mean that
he was an enemy of the United States. Hassoun’s argument—that he was
helping needy people in conflicts around the world—did not make sense
in this context. You can provide humanitarian relief to refugees, or
oppressed people or freedom fighters. You cannot provide relief to
terrorists. They are, by definition, unworthy of support. Once the question
was set up this way at trial, the conclusion was inevitable.
The otherizing of Muslims also explains why neither the government
nor the jury was persuaded by the argument that jihad can mean many
different things in Islam. Jihad in Arabic simply means “struggle,” and
can mean anything from self-actualization and affirmation of religious
faith to defense of Muslims living under oppressive regimes to the kind of
violent jihad the Al Qaida espoused.79 But if we are fighting a global war
against a unified enemy, it hardly matters which definition you choose;
there is no justification for giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
Hassoun, for his part, argued that he never intended any of the funds
he provided to go towards supporting violence. Instead, he maintained
throughout, and still maintains to this day, that he was trying to help people
by providing humanitarian aid. He believed that he was supporting
Padilla’s religious education, not supporting his journey to Afghanistan to
join an Al Qaida training camp. The jury did not buy it. After two days of
deliberation, it voted to convict Hassoun and his co-defendants on all three
counts.
The judge, however, pushed back on the government’s case theory
at sentencing. The government asked for a life sentence for Hassoun and
the other two defendants, but the judge refused and instead issued a
sentence below the sentencing guidelines range.80 She explained that the
jury had rejected the defendants’ argument that their acts were
humanitarian, not criminal.81 Still, she did not think a life sentence was
appropriate. She concluded:
No so-called act of terrorism occurred on United States soil. These
defendants did not seek to damage United States infrastructure,
shipping interests, power plants or government buildings. There was
never a plot to harm individuals inside the United States or to kill
government or political officials. There was never a plot to overthrow
the United States government . . . . What the defendants sought to do
was provide support to people sited in various conflicts involving
79. See Jihad, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/jihad
[https://perma.cc/7CJW-8FWQ].
80. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 70, at 8 ¶¶ 14–16.
81. Id. at 6 ¶¶ 4–6.

542

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:525

Muslims around Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Northern
Africa was found to be criminal. The evidence indicated the
defendants sought to provide financial, personnel and material to
individuals engaged in armed conflict in these areas. This material
support is a violation of the statutes that form the basis of this
indictment. However, there is no evidence that these defendants
personally maimed, killed, or kidnapped anyone in the United States
or elsewhere. Also, the government has pointed to no identifiable
victims. Despite this, this behavior is a crime.82

As for the government’s argument that Hassoun and his codefendants were so dangerous, they must be given a life sentence, the
judge found that argument specious:
The government intercepted most of Mr. Hassoun’s telephones,
work, home, cell and fax. The interceptions and investigation
continued for many, many years. He was questioned and never
charged with a crime. The government knew where Mr. Hassoun
was, knew what he was doing and the government did nothing. This
fact does not support the government’s argument that Mr. Hassoun
poses such a danger to the community that he needs to be imprisoned
for the rest of his life.83

He received a sentence of 188 months, minus the amount of time he
spent in immigration detention.84 The government did not appeal the
sentence.85
Hassoun served his criminal sentence in various Bureau of Prisons’
facilities, including in the Communications Management Unit (CMU) in
Marion, Illinois. Dubbed “Little Guantanamo”86 or “Guantanamo
North,”87 these CMUs—opened first in Terre Haute, Indiana and then in
Marion—were created in 2006 specifically to house those convicted of
terrorism offenses. The CMU tightly controlled the inmates’
82. Id. at 5 ¶¶ 19–25, 6 ¶¶ 7–19.
83. Id. at 8 ¶¶ 8–16.
84. Id. at 17 ¶¶13–17.
85. The defendants did appeal a number of different issues, including the court’s decision to
allow the prosecution to play the Osama bin Laden interview, and the government appealed Padilla’s
sentence. On appeal, the 11th Circuit affirmed the judgment and found that the court had imposed an
unreasonably low sentence for Padilla. United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1119 (11th Cir.
2011).
86. Dean Kuipers, Isolation Prisons Under Fire, L.A. TIMES (June 18, 2009),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-jun-18-na-terror18-story.html
[https://perma.cc/7V8R-L97W].
87. Nausheen Husain, ‘Guantanamo North’ Prison Units in the Midwest Are Under Fire for
Their Harsh Conditions. After 10 Years, One Man Is Still Fighting His Case, CHICAGO TRIB. (Dec. 6,
2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-muslims-special-prison-units-midwest-20191206yjcnfmcdwjcbpaovtcw3trttnq-story.html [https://perma.cc/N3P4-EVHH].
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communications, allowing them only one 15-minute phone call per week
and one two-hour visit per month.88 After the ACLU sued the Bureau of
Prisons,89 the government began moving non-Muslims into the unit to
mitigate the appearance of racial profiling and religious discrimination.90
Still, most CMU inmates were Arab and/or Muslim, including some
prisoners who had not been convicted of terrorism offenses at all.91
One of the non-Muslim inmates who was moved into CMU, Andy
Stepanian, got to know Hassoun during his stint in the unit, and later spoke
about their friendship to Reuters. He described how after Hassoun learned
that he was vegan, he worked with the other inmates to gather vegan food
for Stepanian to eat. Watching demonstrators protesting the Iraq War on
television, Hassoun became teary and said to the other inmates, “I told you
not everyone in this country is bad.”92
Stepanian expanded on his friendship with Hassoun in a declaration
he later submitted in Hassoun’s habeas case. He described Hassoun as “not
Muslim enough through the eyes of the other Muslim inmates.”93 He
described Hassoun’s political views this way:
Did Adham support the Palestinian struggle for self determination?
Yes, but I never once heard Adham express support for violent
actions to be taken against Israelis. Did Adham have criticisms of US
foreign policy, especially policies that related to US wars overseas?
Yes, but again I never once heard Adham express any violent
sentiments towards US forces, state actors, or anyone related to those
policies. I observed Adham to be a deeply principled and
compassionate man that abhorred all cruelty and violence, regardless
if that violence comes from Israel, the United States, or his fellow
Muslims.94

88. Dan Eggen, Facility Holding Terrorism Inmates Limits Communication, WASH. POST (Feb.
25, 2007), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/24/
AR2007022401231_pf.html [https://perma.cc/Q4N7-FZK8]; Daniel McGowan, Tales from Inside the
U.S. Gitmo, HUFFINGTON POST (June 8, 2009), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/tales-from-inside-theus_b_212632 [https://perma.cc/WV3E-PLX4].
89. Proposed Amended Complaint, Benkahla v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 2:09-cv-00025WTL-DML, https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/benkahla-v-federal-bureau-prisons-et-alamended-complaint [https://perma.cc/M65Y-DKFM].
90. Carrie Johnson, ‘Guantanamo North’: Inside Secretive U.S. Prisons, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Mar. 3, 2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134168714/guantanamo-north-inside-u-s-secretiveprisons [https://perma.cc/W5WH-E7UP].
91. McGowan, supra note 88.
92. Basil Katz, Locked Up with Militants, Freed American Talks, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2010),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-prisons-rights/locked-up-with-militants-freed-american-talksidUSTRE62T3MF20100330 [https://perma.cc/7ZJC-4N26].
93. Declaration of Andy Stepanian ¶ 11, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69 (W.D.N.Y.),
order vacated, appeal dismissed, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-00370, ECF No. 248-3.
94. Id. ¶ 15.
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Stepanian also told the story of how Hassoun responded to the
terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2010. After several other inmates expressed
support for the terrorists’ actions, Hassoun “expressed disgust over the
attacks,” and recounted him saying “if you kill one innocent life, all of
innocence dies with them!”95 Stepanian’s overall impression of Hassoun
is reminiscent of the letters of support from his co-workers and friends in
his criminal case:
What I observed of Adham while I was at the CMU was that Adham
was a compassionate, kind, generous, deeply principled man, who
valued human life both inside and outside of his community. Adham
greeted me with warmth and attempted to diffuse something
dangerous in me . . . He just convinced me to do as much good as I
can, but also be good to myself, and become better for the sake of my
loved ones.96

Stepanian credited Hassoun with helping him overcome his anger at
being imprisoned and said that he “was on a path to self-destruct or
recidivate, and had it not been for people like Adham who interrupted that
trajectory I don’t know if I’d be where I am today.”97
During his time in Bureau of Prisons’ custody, including in the CMU
where all of his communications were monitored, there was not a single
allegation that Hassoun was radicalizing others or expressing support for
terrorism or terrorist groups, let alone planning attacks for when he got
out.
D. ICE Detention
Hassoun completed his sentence in October 2017 and was transferred
to the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) so that
DHS could effectuate his removal. There was only one problem: as a
stateless Palestinian, Hassoun still had nowhere to go.98 After six months
in detention, Hassoun filed a habeas petition under Zadvydas v. Davis.99
ICE attempted to delay Hassoun’s release. First, ICE informed the
court that it was in high-level talks with Lebanon, as well as several other

95. Id. ¶ 17.
96. Id. ¶ 18.
97. Id. ¶ 21.
98. The government failed to recognize that Hassoun was stateless for quite some time. See
Decision to Continue Detention, Hassoun v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-586-FPG (W.D.N.Y. Jan 2, 2019),
ECF No. 42-1. As long as a year after Hassoun was detained by ICE, the agency was issuing paperwork
identifying him as “a citizen of Lebanon.” Id.
99. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Hassoun v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-586-FPG (W.D.N.Y.
Jan 2, 2019), ECF No. 1.
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countries with which Hassoun or his family members had potential ties.100
After Hassoun’s counsel received confirmation that Lebanon was no
longer considering the government’s request, and after expert testimony
from the former head of UNWRA explaining that neither Lebanon nor
Israel (which controls access to the Palestinian territories) would allow
Hassoun to return, the government identified a mystery country with
which it was allegedly in high-level discussions.
On January 2, 2019, Judge Frank Geraci granted Hassoun’s habeas
petition, rejecting the government’s arguments that his removal would
occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.101 The judge gave the
government two months before it was required to release Hassoun.102 The
government filed a notice at the end of January identifying two additional
mystery countries with which it was in contact about Hassoun, but Judge
Geraci refused to delay Hassoun’s release. The government was faced with
a firm deadline—March 1—before which it needed to release Hassoun,
remove him, or figure out another plan.
II. HISTORY OF PROLONGED CIVIL DETENTION
National security detention is not a category that courts have
recognized as an exception to the general prohibition against preventative
detention. Perhaps the closest courts have come was in Koremastu v.
United States, in which the Supreme Court upheld the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II on national security grounds.103
That case was heavily criticized for decades before the Supreme Court
finally overturned it in 2018 with Trump v. Hawaii.104 However, since
Korematsu concerned the rights of U.S. citizens, overturning it did not
answer the question of whether a non-citizen could be held in preventative
detention on national security grounds, the question that Hassoun case
raised.
National security detention lies at the intersection of three distinct
types of civil detention, each of which has developed separately in the law:
civil commitment, detention of enemy combatants and prisoners of war,
100. Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Dismiss
Improper Respondents, Hassoun v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-00586-FPG (W.D.N.Y. Jan 2, 2019), ECF
No. 14 (“To date, ICE has requested travel documents for Petitioner from Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon,
the Palestinian Territories, Somalia, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates, and discussed the matter
with high-level representatives of those foreign governments.”).
101. Hassoun v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-586-FPG, 2019 WL 78984 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019).
102. Id. at *7.
103. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
104. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (“Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it
was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law under
the Constitution.’”).
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and immigration detention. In order to understand where national security
detention fits into this legal landscape, I briefly outline the legal
development of each of the three types of detention below.
A. Civil Commitment
Since its inception, the United States has embraced a general
prohibition against preventative civil detention. The right against
detention without trial is considered a pillar of democratic governance that
dates back to the Magna Carta105 and was enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution as part of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the Sixth Amendment.106 However, the constitutional right to liberty
was never absolute. In 1905, the Supreme Court explained that:
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis
organized society could not exist with safety to its members.107

In the late 18th and 19th centuries, civil commitment laws were most
commonly used against individuals suffering from mental illness (who
were called “lunatics” or the “insane” in the vernacular of the time), either
after a jury verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity or in lieu of criminal
charges.108
Courts justified these early laws109 on the grounds that those with
mental illness could not control their behavior and so traditional deterrence
through criminal penalties would fail.110 This same justification
105. Duncan v. State of La., 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (“[B]y the time our Constitution was
written, jury trial in criminal cases had been in existence in England for several centuries and carried
impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta.”).
106. U.S. Const., amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law”); Am. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial…”). The Declaration of Independence also lists “depriving us in many cases,
of the benefits of Trial by Jury” as one of the grievances justifying the country’s independence from
England.
107. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
108. JUDITH LYNN FAILER, WHO QUALIFIES FOR RIGHTS: HOMELESSNESS, MENTAL ILLNESS,
AND CIVIL COMMITMENT 71 (2002).
109. Prior to the incorporation of the Due Process Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment, state
courts approved of the practice of civilly committing the mentally ill. Colby v. Jackson, 12 N.H. 526,
533 (1842); In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122, 125 (Mass.1845). The practice was later upheld by the
Supreme Court. State of Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Court of Ramsey Cty., 309 U.S. 270, 274,
(1940).
110. Oakes, 8 Law Rep. at 126; Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1290 (1966) (“Whether persons who are not mentally ill commit dangerous
acts or avoid them is thought to depend on a process of choice. This process is respected and valued;

2022]

Domestic National Security Detention

547

underpinned the early quarantine laws that allowed temporary
commitment of individuals with communicable diseases to protect public
health111—an infectious individual cannot help but be a danger to the
community and they therefore present a problem not readily addressed by
the criminal justice system.112
The categories of individuals subject to preventative detention
expanded in the 20th century, even as the procedural protections for such
individuals increased.113 Most notably, states began passing laws that
allowed for the civil commitment of sex offenders after their criminal
sentences had been completed,114 a practice that the Supreme Court upheld
in Kansas v. Hendricks in 1997.115 The factual predicate of these laws—
that sex offenders are at a high risk of recidivism because they have a
mental defect that renders their conduct compulsory—is more stereotype
than truth. Recent research suggests that sex offenders are actually less
likely to reoffend than other offenders.116
Yet, while the justification for these exceptions was sometimes
dubious, it at least provided a limiting principle. The Court in Hendricks
made clear that “[a] finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily
not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary

only by not confining even those who can be accurately predicted to be dangerous can all persons be
permitted to make the choice. On the other hand, whether mentally ill persons act dangerously is
thought to depend not on their own choice but on the chance effects of their disease. Confining them
hinders no respected process.”). In fact, this is only true for a very small percentage of mentally ill
individuals. Most individuals who suffer from mental illness are not dangerous and can control their
behavior.
111. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
112. These laws were also sometimes justified under the principle of parens patriae. FAILER,
supra note 108, at 72. The Supreme Court rejected this justification in O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975), holding that the government could not hold a non-dangerous person indefinitely
merely because it was in their best interest.
113. Failer, supra note 108, at 80–82; Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076 (1st Cir. 1973); In re
Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Bell v. Wayne Cty. Gen. Hosp. At Eloise, 384 F.
Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Dixon v.
Attorney Gen. of Com. of Pa., 325 F. Supp. 966, 972 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.
Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976). The Supreme
Court weighed in on the procedural protections required for civil commitment under the Due Process
Clause in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), holding that the government must bear the burden
of showing that an individual suffers from a mental defect and is a danger to the community by clear
and convincing evidence.
114. Raquel Blacher, Historical Perspective of the “Sex Psychopath” Statute: From the
Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 897 (1995).
115. The Supreme Court has also upheld detention that is incident to the criminal process, such
as pre-trial detention. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
116. ROGER PRZYBYLSKI, DEP’T OF JUST., RECIDIVISM OF ADULT SEXUAL
OFFENDERS (2015) https://smart.ojp.gov/somapi/chapter-5-adult-sex-offender-recidivism
[https://perma.cc/4H73-JT3Z].

548

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:525

commitment.”117 Instead, preventative detention was only permitted when
there was some additional factor that rendered the traditional criminal
justice system an inadequate alternative.
The Court’s rationale for the “dangerousness-plus” rule does not
withstand close scrutiny. Some individuals will be dangerous whether or
not there is a plus factor, and it is not clear why the state has a lesser
interest in preventing those individuals from committing crimes. Some
people will never be deterred from criminal activity, regardless of their
volitional state. Why should it matter that someone commits a crime
because of mental illness or because they suffer from pedophilia, rather
than because of economic necessity, a traumatic childhood, drug
addiction, or another of the myriad of reasons people commit crimes?
Practically speaking, however, it is clear why the Supreme Court
adopted this limiting principle. Unwilling to overturn the centuries-old
practice of civilly committing the mentally ill and other disfavored groups,
it needed some principle beyond dangerousness to prevent the exception
from swallowing the general rule against preventative detention. Without
a limiting principle, the government would never have an incentive to
charge someone criminally if they could accomplish the same goal (and
perhaps even hold someone longer) by declaring them a danger to the
community. Without a limiting principle, the criminal justice system
would quickly become obsolete, as the government would undoubtedly
decide that it would prefer not to grant individuals the constitutional rights
that come with criminal prosecutions. In order to avoid this slippery slope,
the Supreme Court has carefully limited the categories of individuals who
can be detained because they are dangerous even if they have not
committed any crime.
B. Enemy Combatants and the Laws of War
Rules regarding detention in international conflicts are rooted in
international, not constitutional law. The Third Geneva Convention of
1949 allows the detention of prisoners of war for the duration of hostilities,
requiring their release “without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities.”118 In order to legally detain an individual under the Third
Geneva Convention, a nation must only designate the individual as a
prisoner of war as defined by the Convention; no other proceeding is
required.119 Historically, most prisoners of war have not been held on U.S.
soil; thus, they have not been able to challenge their detention in U.S.
117. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
118. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
[1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, art. 118.
119. Id. at art. 4.
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courts.120 However, there have been exceptions, most notably during the
Civil War and in the War on Terror, during which individuals detained in
Afghanistan were sent to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, over which the United
States exercises territorial jurisdiction.121
In these cases, the Supreme Court has made quite clear that detaining
enemy combatants during hostilities is legal. As the Supreme Court
explained in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld:
The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture,
detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by “universal agreement
and practice,” are “important incident[s] of war.” Ex parte Quirin,
supra, at 28, 30, 63 S.Ct. 2. The purpose of detention is to prevent
captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking
up arms once again.122

But the Hamdi Court put several important limitations on the
government’s power to detain enemy combatants. First, Hamdi—a U.S.
citizen—was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan.123 The Court
distinguished the case from Ex parte Milligan, a Civil War-era case in
which the Court had found that a citizen arrested in a state not in rebellion
(Indiana) in his home could not be tried by military commission.124
Second, enemy combatants must be given a chance to challenge their
designation as enemy combatants.125 The Court left open, however,
exactly what process was due.126 A few years later, in Boumediene v.
Bush,127 the Court held that those rights included the right to petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under the Constitution, and lower courts have since
provided guidance on what exactly must occur in those habeas
proceedings.128
Still, in the years after 9/11, the government attempted to expand its
well-established war power to include individuals detained on U.S. soil.
Padilla was one example of this. Another example was the case of Ali
Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a lawful permanent resident who was arrested in
December 2001 as a material witness. He was then indicted on credit card
120. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (nonresident enemy aliens have no right to
petition for habeas corpus).
121. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).
122. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
123. Id. at 522 n.1.
124. Id. at 521–22.
125. Id. at 533.
126. Id. at 539.
127. 553 U.S. 723, 728 (2008).
128. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (determining what evidence the
government can use to prove enemy combatant status); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (determining that use of preponderance of the evidence standard in detention hearings did not
violate the Constitution and that hearsay was admissible).
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fraud charges before being designated as an unlawful enemy combatant
and transferred to military custody in 2003.129 The government never
provided a reason for transferring Al-Marri to military custody after he
had been criminally charged, but the timing of the transfer suggests that
the government was concerned either about what would come out during
the pre-trial proceedings or that it would be unable to obtain a guilty
verdict. The transfer came on the eve of a pre-trial hearing on Al-Marri’s
motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence.130
The Fourth Circuit initially struck down Al-Marri’s detention,
holding that the government could not exercise its power to detain enemy
combatants with respect to individuals whom the government did not
allege had ever fought against U.S. forces overseas:
The
core
assumption
underlying
the
Government’s
position . . . seems to be that persons lawfully within this country,
entitled to the protections of our Constitution, lose their civilian status
and become “enemy combatants” if they have allegedly
engaged in criminal conduct on behalf of an organization seeking to
harm the United States. Of course, a person who commits
a crime should be punished, but when a civilian protected by the Due
Process Clause commits a crime, he is subject to charge, trial, and
punishment in a civilian court, not to seizure and confinement by
military authorities.131

The Fourth Circuit then took the Al-Marri decision en banc,
producing a dizzying array of decisions that did little to resolve the legality
of Al-Marri’s detention,132 though the en banc court did conclude that if
what the government said about Al-Marri was true, the government could
detain him as an enemy combatant.133 The Supreme Court agreed to hear
the case,134 but the government—as in Padilla’s case—mooted it out
before it could be heard135 by transferring Al-Marri back to criminal
custody.136 Though the government’s motives were again unclear, it was

129. Jane
Meyer,
The
Hard
Cases,
NEW YORKER,
(Feb.
23,
2009),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/02/23/the-hard-cases [https://perma.cc/4LG6-BWB4].
130. Jonathan Hafetz, Al-Marri’s End and the Failed Experiment of Domestic Military
Detention, JUST SEC. (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/19168/al-marris-failedexperiment-domestic-military-detention [https://perma.cc/CR2R-XNF9].
131. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 186 (4th Cir. 2007).
132. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008).
133. Id. at 216.
134. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 555 U.S. 1066 (2008).
135. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009).
136. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Ali Al-Marri Indicted for Providing Material Support to AlQaeda (Feb. 27, 2009) (on file with institution).
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understood by commentators at the time as an admission by the
government that it was concerned about losing at the Supreme Court.137
Both Al-Marri and Padilla were eventually convicted of criminal
offenses,138 and when Al-Marri completed his criminal sentence in 2015,
he was removed to Qatar without incident,139 deferring the question of
what the government could do in cases in which removal was impossible.
But even though the Supreme Court did not have an opportunity to weigh
in on the legality of either Padilla’s or Al-Marri’s detention, the legal
challenges discouraged the government from exercising its authority in
this manner. After 2003, when both Padilla and Al-Marri were put in
military detention, the United States has not detained any other suspected
terrorist caught on U.S. soil.140
C. Immigration Detention
Immigration detention was historically viewed through a different
lens than civil commitment because of the unique power of the federal
government over immigration; it implicates national sovereignty and
foreign relations in a way that other civil detention does not.141 Nor does
immigration detention resemble military detention during armed
conflict—most immigrants arrive from countries with whom the United
States is not at war.
Congress passed the first statute authorizing immigration detention
in 1891,142 shortly after passing the infamous Chinese Exclusion Laws that
barred the admission of most laborers from China.143 It was not until five
years later that the Supreme Court weighed in on the legality of
immigration detention. In Wong Wing v. United States, the Supreme Court
officially sanctioned “temporary confinement, as part of the means
necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of

137. Hafetz, supra note 130.
138. See supra Section II.B; Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Ali Al-Marri Pleads Guilty to
Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Al-Qaeda (Apr. 30, 2009) (on file with institution).
139. Missy Ryan, Qatari Man, Once Held as Enemy Combatant, Is Quietly Released from
Supermax Prison, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/qatari-man-once-held-as-enemy-combatant-is-quietly-released-from-supermaxprison/2015/01/20/0ada86ec-a0d0-11e4-9f89-561284a573f8_story.html [https://perma.cc/T5R4CHZL].
140. Hafetz, supra note 130.
141. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (“[A]ny policy toward [immigrants] is vitally
and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations,
the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.”).
142. CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON: AMERICA’S
OBSESSION WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS 27 (2019).
143. Id. at 25.
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aliens”144 as a means of bolstering the sovereign authority to exclude noncitizens from the country.
The Court did not explain exactly why detention was necessary to
protect national sovereignty, though a half-century later, it explained that
“[d]etention is necessarily a part of t[he]deportation procedure. Otherwise,
aliens arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United
States during the pendency of deportation proceedings.”145 The real reason
the government wanted immigrants detained at the border was probably
less a concern about public safety and more a concern about accidentally
granting them rights that would complicate their removal. If an immigrant
was released into the United States, he was no longer “at the border,”
where the federal government’s plenary power over immigration was at its
highest.146
Throughout the early to mid-twentieth century, the U.S. detained
millions of immigrants, most notably on Angel Island in California and
Ellis Island in New York.147 Although Wong Wing did not contemplate
prolonged detention, a later case, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, did. In Mezei, the Supreme Court upheld the long-term detention
of an arriving resident on Ellis Island.148 In Knauff v. Shaughnessy, decided
a few years before Mezei, the Supreme Court rejected a due process
challenge brought by a non-citizen in removal proceedings, declaring that
non-citizens did not enjoy the protections of the Due Process Clause
except to the extent granted by Congress.149 These cases seemed to place
immigration detention into an entirely different category from civil
commitment and put few restrictions on its use.
Angel Island was closed in 1940150 and Ellis Island in 1954,151 and
for a few decades, immigration detention fell out of favor. However,
beginning in the 1980s, after the Mariel boatlift precipitated the detention
of over 10,000 Cubans, immigration detention became politically popular
once again, and the numbers of immigrants in detention rose, from 7,000

144. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).
145. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952).
146. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 142, at 25; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)
(explaining that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects “all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction” of the United States).
147. Id. at 29.
148. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
149. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
150. United States Immigration Station (USIS), ANGEL ISLAND CONSERVANCY,
https://angelisland.org/history/united-states-immigration-station-usis/ [https://perma.cc/F3W5-S678].
151. Andrew Glass, Government Shuts Down Ellis Island, Nov. 12, 1954, POLITICO (Nov. 12,
2014) https://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/federal-government-immigration-ellis-island-nov-121954-112780 [https://perma.cc/B6S3-FPKT].
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immigrants per day in 1994 to more than 50,000 per day in 2019.152 The
rise in detained immigrants required more detention facilities. Private
prison companies fulfilled part of the need; local jails fulfilled the rest.153
In 1996, Congress enacted a broad mandatory detention statute for
many immigrants with criminal convictions,154 and detention of
immigrants without criminal records increased as well.155 At the same
time, the number of immigrants in removal proceedings skyrocketed,156
causing long delays and increasing the time immigrants spent in detention
fighting their removal.
In 2003, the Supreme Court again affirmed that immigration
detention was legal in Demore v. Kim, holding that the government can
detain a non-citizen “for the limited period of his removal proceedings,”157
although it left open precisely what a “limited period” meant.158 Demore
also added an additional justification for limited detention during removal
proceedings—“releasing deportable criminal aliens on bond would lead to
an unacceptable rate of flight.”159
However, in Zadvydas v. Davis, decided a few months before
September 11, the Court addressed immigration detention that was not for
a limited period, but was potentially indefinite.160 In many cases, the
government cannot effectuate removal after a final order of removal is
entered. This can occur for several different reasons: if an individual is
stateless, if their country of nationality will not accept them, or if the
government has granted deferral of removal because of international nonrefoulment obligations under the 1984 Convention Against Torture.161
An individual detained in these circumstances may never be
removed, and so it is distinct from the brief detention contemplated by
Wong Wing. For the first time, the Supreme Court determined that this
kind of prolonged civil detention was subject to the same rules as
traditional civil commitment, namely, that there must be a “special
justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the
152. Katharina Buchholz, Number of Immigrant Detainees Rises Quickly, STATISTA (Jan. 3,
2020), https://www.statista.com/chart/17977/number-of-detainees-in-facilities-of-dhs-immigration
[https://perma.cc/KP9C-P8LD].
153. ADAM GOODMAN, THE DEPORTATION MACHINE 190 (2020).
154. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA or
IIRAIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
155. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, (1996); Art. 236(c).
156. TRAC, IMMIGRATION COURT BACKLOG JUMPS WHILE CASE PROCESSING SLOWS (2018)
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/516 [https://perma.cc/QEG4-LFMN].
157. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
158. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
159. Demore, 538 U.S. at 520.
160. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
161. 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85, UN Doc. A/RES/39/46, art. 3 (Oct. 12, 1984).
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‘individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint.’”162 A few years later, the Supreme Court extended this ruling to
cover non-citizens caught at the border as well as those detained in the
United States.163
Though Zadvydas was technically decided on constitutional
avoidance grounds—the Court determined that the statute should be
construed not to authorize prolonged detention after six months unless
removable was reasonably foreseeable164—the decision made clear that a
statute that allowed for the indefinite detention of non-citizens solely on
the grounds of dangerousness would not pass constitutional muster. Unlike
in previous cases, the Court did not cabin immigration detention in a
separate category but instead treated it as it would any other kind of civil
detention.
But the Court left open the possibility that additional special
justifications could be recognized. Justice Breyer made clear that his
opinion did not “consider terrorism or other special circumstances where
special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and
for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with
respect to matters of national security.”165
III. NATIONAL SECURITY DETENTION
After Hassoun could no longer be held under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 as a
normal immigration detainee,166 the government faced a dilemma.
Hassoun was not an enemy combatant, and thus could not be held under
the laws of war, but neither did he fall into any of the categories in which
the Supreme Court had previously held could justify civil preventative
detention in the domestic context—he was not suffering from mental
illness, for example. Instead, the government turned to two other post-9/11
detention authorities that had never been tested in court: a regulation
promulgated after the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas and a
provision of the USA PATRIOT Act.

162. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)). It is
unclear after Zadvydas and Clark whether Mezei remains good law. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 703
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court expressly declines to apply or overrule Mezei, but attempts to
distinguish it—or, I should rather say, to obscure it in a legal fog.”).
163. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
164. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
165. Id. at 696.
166. Hassoun v. Sessions, Case No. 18-cv-586-FPG, 2019 WL 78984, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2,
2019) (“Accordingly, because the Court cannot conclude that there is a significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, Petitioner’s continued detention is no longer authorized
under § 1231(a)(6).”).
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A. Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act
Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act, signed into law on October
26, 2001,167 purports to give the government broad authority to detain noncitizens convicted or suspected of terrorism offenses.168 In order to
detain an individual under Section 412, the Secretary of Homeland
Security must first certify that they have reasonable grounds to believe
that: “the [non-citizen] . . . (A) is described in section 1182(a)(3)(A)(i),
1182(a)(3)(A)(iii), 1182(a)(3)(B), 1227(a)(4)(A)(i), 1227(a)(4)(A)(iii), or
1227(a)(4)(B) of this title; or (B) is engaged in any other activity that
endangers the national security of the United States.”169
The statutes cited in Subsection (a)(3)(A) are sections of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that allow for the exclusion or
deportation of non-citizens that have engaged in terrorist activity or other
national security-related offenses, such as espionage or attempted
overthrow of the U.S. government by violent or other unlawful means.170
None of these statutes require a conviction.171 Instead, a unilateral
assertion by the executive branch that someone falls within the statute is
sufficient. In removal proceedings, the government must prove these
grounds of deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence,172 but Section 412 provided only that the government has
“reasonable grounds to believe,” which is akin to a probable cause
standard.173
Subsection (a)(3)(B) is even broader, allowing the government to
certify an individual “engaged in any other activity that endangers the
national security of the United States.”174 If the government chose to
interpret this definition capaciously, it could encompass many more
individuals than those we would think of as “terrorists” in the traditional
sense of the word. For instance, could someone accused of alien smuggling
be certified as endangering national security? What about a drug
167. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a.
169. Id. § 1226a(a)(3). Although the statute references the Attorney General, certification
authority transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); 8 U.S.C. § 1103.
170. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(A)(i), 1182(a)(3)(A)(iii), 1182(a)(3)(B), 1227(a)(4)(A)(i),
1227(a)(4)(A)(iii), 1227(a)(4)(B).
171. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A) (Attorney General must have “reasonable ground to
believe” that a non-citizen has engaged in espionage or other conduct that threatens national security.).
172. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
173. Yusupov v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 650 F.3d 968, 975 (3d Cir. 2011) (“‘reasonable grounds
to believe’ under the INA is equivalent to probable cause”); United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105,
1114 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The phrase ‘reasonable grounds to believe,’ . . . is often synonymous with
probable cause.”).
174. 8 U.S.C.§ 1226a(a)(3)(B).
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trafficker? Or those who took part in the Black Lives Matters protests in
2020, some of which ended in looting? Or the pro-Trump insurrectionists
who attempted to take over the Capitol? It presumably must mean
something more than run-of-the-mill petty crime, but what counts beyond
that is unclear.
Once an individual is certified, the statute permits two kinds of
national security detention. First, the statute provides for detention prior
to the initiation of criminal or removal proceedings and gives the
government seven days to either charge individuals criminally, or initiate
removal proceedings in immigration court.175 Normally, an individual
arrested on criminal charges must be arraigned within forty-eight hours,
or seventy-two hours over weekends.176 Thus, the statute provides the
government with four to five additional days within which it can detain
suspected terrorists before bringing criminal charges or filing a notice to
appear.
As it turns out, the government had already granted itself this power
in an interim regulation issued on September 20, 2001,177 and it is far from
clear that the government needed this power anyway. Previously, the
regulation had required that the INA issue a notice to appear (NTA), the
equivalent of a charging document, within twenty-four hours of arrest. But
the interim regulation expanded this time period to forty-eight hours and
also provided that the time limitation did not apply “in the event of an
emergency or other extraordinary circumstance in which case a
determination will be made within an additional reasonable period of
time,”178 essentially permitting indefinite detention absent some sort of
legal challenge. The Office of the Inspector General later found that 41%
of the individuals arrested as part of the investigation into the 9/11 attacks
were not served an NTA within three days, and some were held for more
than a month before being charged.179
Perhaps most importantly, the INA has never contained a
requirement for when the non-citizen must be served with the NTA, when
the NTA must be filed in court, or when the non-citizen must receive a
hearing in immigration court. To the contrary, the first master calendar
hearing cannot be scheduled any sooner than ten days after the government
175. Id. § 1226a(a)(5).
176. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); Fed. R. Crim. Pro 5.
177. Custody Procedures, 66 FR 48334-01, 2001 WL 1094737 (Sept. 20, 2001).
178. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d).
179. OIG REPORT, supra note 37, at 30. In response to the OIG report on abuses of immigration
detention after 9/11, a bill was introduced to change the law to require that ICE serve a notice to appear
within forty-eight to seventy-two hours of being arrested on immigration violations, but that bill did
not pass. See Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2005, H.R.1502, https://www.congress.gov/bill/109thcongress/house-bill/1502?s=1&r=50 [https://perma.cc/L3KR-D33K].
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serves a notice to appear in order to give the non-citizen time to find
counsel.180 In practice, it is common for non-citizens to wait weeks or
months to have a first appearance in immigration court.181 During this
time, the executive branch makes the determination about whether an
individual is removable and subject to mandatory detention. A non-citizen
can challenge that determination at his first court hearing, but even then,
the standard of review is extremely deferential to the government.182 No
court has held that the Due Process Clause requires that non-citizens must
receive a hearing sooner than seven days after arrest, and in 2001, no court
had considered the question at all.183
Finally, the NTA is much less detailed than a criminal indictment;
the government can charge someone as removable without providing
anything more than the statutory provision. Thus, all the government
would have to do is allege that a non-citizen “has engaged in terrorist
activity” and could hold them for months before being required to provide
any evidence at all.184 Moreover, because of the certification requirements
in Section 1226a, including the fact that either the Secretary or Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security must issue the certification,185 whenever
the government has the grounds to invoke it, it will be easier to simply
issue an NTA.
In short, if the government wants to detain a non-citizen while
pursuing a removal order on the grounds that the non-citizen is engaged in
terrorist activity, it is extremely easy for them to do so. And the
government can transfer the non-citizen to criminal custody and charge
them at any time during the removal process or afterward. There is simply
no circumstance in which the government would need these additional
four to five days of (a)(3) detention.
In fact, this precise sequence of events is what happened to Hassoun.
He was initially arrested on the charge of overstaying his visa. When he
challenged his detention, the immigration judge, and subsequently the
180. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(B).
181. See, e.g., Vazquez Perez v. Decker, No. 18-CV-10683, 2020 WL 7028637, at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (stating that the average time to first appearance is eleven to forty-two days);
Cancino Castellar v. McAleenan, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (stating that the average
time to first appearance is one to three months).
182. Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999) (non-citizen bears the burden of showing
that the government is “substantially unlikely” to prevail on his charges of removability).
183. Vazquez Perez, 2020 WL 7028637, at *15 (setting ten-day limit between arrest and
presentment in immigration court).
184. For a sample NTA, see National Immigrant Justice Center, Sample Notice to Appear,
https://immigrantjustice.org/for-attorneys/legal-resources/file/sample-notice-appear
[https://perma.cc/7BJP-9UYC].
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(4). Many of the duties of the Attorney General were transferred to the
Secretary of Homeland Security in the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, Pub.L. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135 (2002).
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BIA, found that he was properly detained under the mandatory detention
statute.186 The government then held him in immigration detention for a
year and a half before transferring him to criminal custody.187 In other
words, the removal process bought the government an additional eighteen
months during which it could make its criminal case against Hassoun—
much longer than the four to five days allowed under the USA PATRIOT
Act.
Why did Congress pass a statute creating an extraordinary new form
of preventative detention that the government did not actually need? The
answer is in the legislative history. The Bush Administration’s original
draft of the bill that eventually became the USA PATRIOT Act, called the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, contained no requirement that criminal or
removal proceedings be initiated within a set period of time.188 But
Congress pushed back, and the bill was amended to include the seven-day
limitation.189
Why Congress did not just remove it entirely is a mystery. Perhaps
members of Congress were not familiar enough with the immigration
system to know how few rights non-citizens have once they enter the
system and how easy it would be for the government to detain non-citizens
for months or years during their removal proceedings without relying on
Section 412. Not surprisingly, it appears that the government has never
invoked Section 412 with respect to this initial period of detention. It
simply has never had reason to.
The second kind of national security detention authorized by Section
412 concerns individuals certified under (a)(3) whose removal
proceedings have concluded but for whom removal is unlikely in the
reasonably foreseeable future—the exact situation addressed by the Court
in Zadvydas. Subsection (a)(2) instructs that once an individual is certified
pursuant to (a)(3), the government “shall maintain custody of such an alien
until the alien is removed from the United States” even if the individual
has won relief from removal.190 But this authority is subject to a limitation
that the certified individual “may be detained for additional periods of up
to six months only if the release of the alien will threaten the national

186. BIA Decision Dated June 27, 2003, supra note 46.
187. Hassoun was arrested on June 15, 2002. See Man Tied to Bomb Suspect Is Arrested, supra
note 34, and indicted on January 13, 2004, Indictment, United States v. Hassoun, No. 0:04-cr-60001MGC (S.D. Fla. 2008), ECF No. 1.
188. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, Sec. 202, https://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/
ata2001_text.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAN4-MVPJ].
189. Senate Consideration, Amendment, and Passage of S. 1510, 2001 WL 35670364, Oct. 11,
2001, *36.
190. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(2).
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security of the United States or the safety of the community or any
person.”191
Like the seven-day charging requirement, this limitation did not exist
in the first draft of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001.192 It was added in
committee by two members of Congress, Jerry Nadler, and Barbara Lee,
who would go on to vote against the USA PATRIOT Act.193 Clearly,
concerns about the constitutionality of the statute without the limitation
were what motivated their colleagues to vote for the amendment;
Zadvydas was explicitly referenced as the reason for the amendment.194
Some Senators continued to express reservations about giving the
government such broad-reaching detention authority even with the
limitations. Senator Russ Feingold objected to Section 412 because “it still
falls short of meeting even basic constitutional standards of due process
and fairness. The bill continues to allow the Attorney General to detain
persons based on mere suspicion. Our system normally requires higher
standards of proof for a deprivation of liberty.”195 He also expressed
concern that the government would use the statute to detain individuals
engaged in “innocent associational activity.”196 Other Senators expressed
hope that the government would use the power sparingly,197 but in the end,
only Senator Feingold voted against the bill with the USA PATRIOT Act
passing the Senate 98–1,198 and the House of Representatives 357–66.199
Section (a)(6) detention allows for the indefinite detention of an even
broader category of individuals than Section (a)(3). Whereas Section
(a)(3) requires a connection to terrorism or other national security
concerns, Section (a)(6) allows the government to detain an individual on
national security grounds or if they “threaten . . . the safety of the

191. Id. § 1226a(a)(6).
192. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, Sec. 202, https://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/
ata2001_text.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAN4-MVPJ].
193. House Report No. 107-236, USA PATRIOT Act, 2001 WL 34113833, *56.
194. Senate Consideration and Passage of H.R. 3162, 2001 WL 35670371, Oct. 25, 2001, *157
(“For aliens whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Attorney General is
required to demonstrate that release of the alien will adversely affect national security or the safety of
the community or any person before detention may continue beyond the removal period. Indefinite
detention of aliens is permitted only in extraordinary circumstances.”) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 121
S. Ct. 2491 (2001)).
195. Senate Consideration and Passage of H.R. 3162, 2001 WL 35670371, Oct. 25, 2001, *90.
196. 147 Cong. Rec. S10990-02, 147 Cong. Rec. S10990-02, S11022, 2001 WL 1297566.
197. 147 Cong. Rec. S10990-02, 147 Cong. Rec. S10990-02, S11004, 2001 WL 1297566.
198. Roll Call Vote 107th Congress 1st Session, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=1&vote=00313
[https://perma.cc/37CW-GEPK].
199. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 398, https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/roll398.xml
[https://perma.cc/SLC4-U5ST].
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community or any person.”200 In other words, the government does not
need to assert that an individual is a national security risk; a danger to any
individual person will suffice to be held under (a)(6) indefinitely.
Moreover, the statute does not provide the individual with any
process before they are placed in (a)(6) detention; instead, a non-citizen
certified under Section (a)(2) and held under (a)(6) can only challenge that
certification after the fact in a habeas petition.201 Given the speed at which
litigation occurs, it could be a year or more before the government is forced
to justify the detention to anyone other than itself.
Until Hassoun, the government had not used its authority under
(a)(6), and the reason, again, is how the government has used a series of
overlapping authorities to hold individuals suspected of terrorism for as
long as possible. Many of the individuals for whom the government would
want to use Section 412 to detain were prosecuted criminally for terrorismrelated offenses and often faced long sentences after juries inevitably
convicted them. But as those criminal sentences come to an end, the
government will face decisions about what to do. Section 412 provides one
available option.
B. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d)
A few weeks after the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, the
government gave itself an additional detention authority it could use to
hold suspected terrorists. In an interim regulation promulgated on
November 14, 2001, the DOJ laid out a number of “special circumstances”
that it contended would justify holding a non-citizen past six months in
post-final order removal even when removal was not likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future.202 Though this regulation took on increased
importance after 9/11, it is likely that the DOJ had begun work on the
regulation prior to the attacks, especially given the normal timeline for
regulatory action.203 Instead, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zadvydas the
previous June precipitated the promulgation of the regulation.204
Section 241.14 allows for the continued detention of individuals in
four categories: (1) “Aliens with a highly contagious disease that is a threat
to public safety”; (2) “Aliens detained on account of serious adverse
200. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6).
201. Id. at § 1226a(b)(1).
202. Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 FR 56967-01,
*56967, 2001 WL 1408247 (Nov. 14, 2001).
203. DOJ determined it had “good cause” to forgo the regular notice and comment process
because “it is essential to implement without delay a standardized plan for dealing with the detention
or release of numerous aliens whom the Service had determined should not be released because of a
danger to the public or a risk of flight.” Id. at 56975.
204. Id. at 56967.
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foreign policy consequences of release”; (3) “Aliens detained on account
of security or terrorism concerns”; and (4) “Detention of aliens determined
to be specially dangerous” because of a mental condition or personality
disorder.205 The first, second, and fourth categories clearly track the case
law of civil commitment. As explained above, quarantine laws and civil
commitment of the mentally ill are well-established exceptions to the
general rule against preventative civil detention.
The third category—non-citizens detained on account of security or
terrorism concerns—creates the type of prolonged national security
detention that the USA PATRIOT Act had created statutorily the month
before, though the regulation differs from the statute in minor ways. In
order to be held under Section 241.14(d), the Director of ICE must make
a determination that:
(i) The alien is a person described in section 212(a)(3)(A) or (B) or
section 237(a)(4)(A) of (B) of the Act or the alien has engaged or will
likely engage in any other activity that endangers the national
security;
(ii) The alien’s release presents a significant threat to the national
security or a significant risk of terrorism; and
(iii) No conditions of release can reasonably be expected to avoid the
threat to the national security or the risk of terrorism, as the case may
be.206

The ICE Director then makes a recommendation to the Secretary of
Homeland Security, who can certify the detention for successive sixmonth periods.
The statute and the regulation are substantively similar, though there
are differences. Subsections (i) and (ii) collapse the requirements of
subsections (a)(3) (initial certification) and (a)(6) (certification for
prolonged detention) of Section 412 into a single certification. Also, the
regulation does not contain the “safety to the community or any person”
language of Section 412, at least superficially providing a narrower
definition of whom can be detained, and it contains an additional
requirement that DHS must determine that there are no conditions of
release that could avoid the threat posed by releasing the individual.
Procedurally, the regulation and the statute diverge. While Section
412 provides for judicial review of the certification in a writ of habeas
corpus, there is no judicial review provided for in the regulation, and in
fact, the regulation explicitly strips jurisdiction from immigration judges
205. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d)(1).
206. Id.
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and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).207 Nor is there an
administrative review process beyond the initial unilateral executive
decision to invoke the regulation, other than a pro forma re-certification
that must happen every six months. The non-citizen can submit their own
evidence contesting the determination, but the non-citizen has no right to
see the evidence against them. By putting the onus on the non-citizen to
develop the record, the regulation requires the non-citizen to prove a
negative when the government has no duty to disclose the grounds for its
determination. This is particularly problematic because the negative the
non-citizen needs to prove is about future events. As DOJ explained when
it promulgated the regulation:
A decision to continue detention of a removable alien because of
national security or terrorism concerns requires a predictive
judgment. It is an attempt to predict an alien’s possible future
behavior and to assess whether, under compulsion of circumstances
or for other reasons, he might act in a way that creates a real and
legitimate national security threat or an imminent threat to public
safety. The decision may be based upon past or present conduct, but
it also may be based on a wide variety of other circumstances. Thus,
the attempt to define not only the individual’s future actions, but
those of outside and unknown influences renders the decision an
inexact science at best.208

Needless to say, this description of the certification process is not
reassuring, considering that the regulation allows for indefinite detention
without judicial review and minimal administrative procedures that would
mitigate the risk of an erroneous decision.
Subsection (d) provides for much less process than other subsections
of the regulation. For example, for non-citizens who are especially
dangerous due to “mental condition or personality disorder,” the
regulation provides for review of detention in a hearing in immigration
court.209 DHS must “attach a written statement that contains a summary of
the basis for the Commissioner’s determination to continue to detain the
alien, including a description of the evidence relied upon to reach the
determination regarding the alien’s special dangerousness” and must
“attach copies of all relevant documents used to reach its decision to
continue to detain the alien.”210 At the hearing, the non-citizen has the right
207. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d)(a)(2) (“[I]mmigration judges and the Board . . . do not have
jurisdiction with respect to aliens described in paragraphs (b), (c), or (d) of this section.”).
208. Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 FR 56967-01, 56973
(citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).
209. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(3), (g).
210. Id. § 241.14(g)(2).
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to cross-examine any government witnesses, including the medical
professional who conducted any mental health examination.211 The noncitizen can appeal an adverse decision to the BIA, ensuring two levels of
review.212
The reasons for the differences in the procedural protections of each
subsection are obvious. Not wanting to run afoul of Addington v. Texas
and Foucha v. Louisiana,213 the government preempted constitutional
challenges by writing a regulation for detaining of the mentally ill that
provided ample process. But in the context of suspected terrorists, there
was no case law—because it had never been attempted before—and so the
government provided almost no process.
There is no way to know how often the government has utilized this
regulation in the years since it was promulgated. Though the government
enacted detailed regulations implementing the Zadvydas decision, the
government often rubber-stamps decisions to continue detention. In many
cases, particularly with respect to high-security detainees, the only
possibility of release comes with the filing of a habeas petition, something
out of reach for most detainees. Thus, for individuals who never file a
habeas petition under Zadvydas, the government may not need to invoke
the regulation to detain them indefinitely. It is also possible that ICE has
invoked the regulation in cases that never became public because the
detainee did not challenge the certification in court.
Nevertheless, we know that DHS has invoked the regulation at least
once because it was the subject of a court challenge. Mohammed Rashed
pleaded guilty in 2002 to the 1982 bombing of a PanAm flight from Tokyo
to Honolulu in which a 16-year-old died.214 His criminal sentence ended
in 2013, and he was transferred to ICE custody.215 But Rashed was a
Jordanian-born Palestinian and stateless, like Hassoun. A habeas petition
was not filed until he had already been in immigration detention for two
years.216 In November 2016, he was removed to Mauritania without the
court ever having decided the legality of his detention.217
211. Id. § 241.14(g)(1), (3).
212. Id. § 241.14(h)(4).
213. See generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71
(1992).
214. Man Who Placed Bomb on 1982 Pam Am Flight Stuck in US Detention Limbo, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (June 21, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/21/mohammed-rashed-panam-830-bombing-detention [https://perma.cc/9BA6-AXG6].
215. Id. Rashed’s plea agreement promise that the government would send him to the country of
his choice after the completion of his criminal sentence, but Israel would not allow him to enter the
West Bank, where he wanted to be sent. Id.
216. Petition for Habeas Corpus, Rashed v. United States, No. 1:15-cv-00888-RJA, ECF No. 1.
217. Phil Fairbanks, Terrorist Bomber Held Here Finds New Home in West Africa, BUFFALO
NEWS (Nov. 26, 2016), https://buffalonews.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/terrorist-bomber-held-
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IV. HASSOUN’S LEGAL CHALLENGES TO HIS DETENTION
On February 22, 2019, one week before Hassoun was to be released,
the government informed Hassoun that it was “initiating procedures in
order to determine whether you will be subject to continued detention.”218
With this, Hassoun’s detention entered its next and final stage as the
government tried one thing after another to prevent him from being
released.
A. Certification under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d)
The first step ICE took was to recommend to the Secretary of
Homeland Security that Hassoun’s detention should continue pursuant to
8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d). In a letter signed by Matthew Albence, the Acting
Deputy Director, the government told Hassoun that:
[Y]our case appears to meet these three criteria [of 8 C.F.R. §
241.14(d)] because you assumed a leadership role in a criminal
conspiracy to recruit fighters and provide material support to terrorist
groups, and because you remain a continuing threat of recruiting,
planning, and providing material support to terrorist activity.219

The statement regarding Hassoun’s past criminal conviction was
clear enough, but the letter provided no support for the statement that
Hassoun “remain[ed] a continuing threat”220 beyond the mere fact of his
criminal conviction. There was no timeline provided for how long it would
take the Secretary of Homeland Security to decide whether to accept the
recommendation. And while Hassoun had not actually been certified for
continued detention, he would remain detained throughout the process.
The letter promised that Hassoun would “be provided with a
reasonable opportunity to review any evidence against [him].”221
However, when Hassoun was provided the administrative record two
months later, it became clear that the government had no intention of
providing Hassoun with access to any evidence at all. The administrative
record consisted of documents related to his criminal conviction and
immigration proceedings, including news stories and press releases about
his case. The only new evidence was an FBI Letterhead Memorandum,

here-finds-new-home-in-west-africa/article_580e0ab9-e777-54bb-972e-3b39284cf86d.html
[https://perma.cc/C4F6-3FYC]; Notice of Dismissal, Rashed v. United States, No. 1:15-cv-00888RJA, ECF No. 48.
218. See Notice of Intent and Factual Basis for Continued Detention at 1, Hassoun v. Searls,
Case No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 13-4.
219. Id. at 3.
220. Id.
221. Id.

2022]

Domestic National Security Detention

565

signed by Christopher Wray, that recommended his detention as a national
security risk.
According to the FBI Memorandum, its assessment was based on
“Hassoun’s prior criminal terrorism conviction . . ., his recent statements,
his lack of cooperation with law enforcement, and his failure to accept
responsibility for his actions.”222
Two of these factors had nothing to do with dangerousness at all:
Hassoun’s failure to cooperate with the government during the initial
period of his detention and his refusal to admit guilt. To this day, Hassoun
maintains his innocence and says that he did not cooperate because he had
nothing to cooperate about.223 In essence, Hassoun argued that he was not
dangerous and never had been. To hold his lack of cooperation against him
created a catch-22. The government argued that in order for Hassoun to
prove that he was not dangerous, he had to admit that he was dangerous
first. At which point, undoubtedly, the government would have used his
own admissions against him.
With respect to the criminal conviction, the sentencing judge had
explicitly rejected a life sentence, finding that Hassoun did not post “such
a danger to the community that he needs to be imprisoned for the rest of
his life.”224 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, if the government
could prove future dangerousness based solely on past criminal conduct,
it would eviscerate the protections of the criminal justice system, with
every criminal sentence potentially becoming a life sentence based on the
government’s “assessment” that the person remained dangerous.
Finally, the Memorandum described “recent statements” that formed
part of the basis for its assessment, stating that “Hassoun previously sought
to advance his Salafist extremist beliefs by fundraising and recruiting on
behalf of al Qaeda-affiliated groups fighting in Bosnia, Chechnya,
Somalia, and Afghanistan.”225 “Since his detention, Hassoun shifted his
allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS).”226 The
Memorandum further alleged that:
• “[T]hree detainees . . . reported . . . that Hassoun was attempting
to recruit fellow detainees in support of ISIS.”
• While speaking at Muslim services in the facility, he espoused
“radical ideology” and used “incendiary rhetoric.”
222. FBI Memorandum Dated February 21, 2019, supra note 62, at 2.
223. Letter from Adham Hassoun to the Court, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69
(W.D.N.Y.), order vacated, appeal dismissed, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-370,
ECF No. 94.
224. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 71, at 8 ¶¶ 15–16.
225. FBI Memorandum Dated February 21, 2019, supra note 62, at 2.
226. Id.
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•

“Hassoun told a fellow detainee that he was communicating with
Faroud Abubaker, a recruiter for ISIS in Trinidad and Tobago”
and “Hassoun also expressed his intentions to travel to Trinidad
and Tobago to attack American interests such as ships exporting
oil. Hassoun identified potential targets for attack, specifically
oil refineries.”
• “Hassoun plans to observe when ships traveling from Trinidad
and Tobago transfer ‘liquid nitrile gas’ to mobile extraction ships
in the open port waters. In or about early 2018, Hassoun stated
that should he be released, ‘I [will] make that dock and port go
boom.’”
• “Hassoun was overheard by a different individual telling a fellow
detainee how to make explosives and plan attacks.”
• “Hassoun told a fellow detainee, who is Egyptian but selfidentifies as American, that ‘[he] deserve[s] to die with
them.’”227
On the basis of these statements, the FBI assessed:
that Hassoun is likely to continue his material support of ISIS and
continue to recruit individuals to carry out attacks against the United
States on behalf of ISIS. More significantly, Hassoun’s admission to
a fellow detainee that he was in contact with a legitimate ISIS
recruiter in Trinidad and Tobago coupled with recent comments that
he wants to make Port Everglades ‘go boom’ reflects a continued and
persistent willingness to personally conduct an attack against the
United States.228

Hassoun argued that it was impossible for him to rebut these
allegations without knowing who the informants were and having the
chance to cross-examine them.229 However, even though he knew few
details about these allegations, three things stood out immediately. First,
the government now accused Hassoun of directly plotting violent attacks
against the United States, which was very different from the indirect
support and recruitment that formed the basis of his criminal conviction.
Second, all of the allegations arose from his time in ICE detention; none
of the statements were made during Hassoun’s 13 years in criminal
custody despite the fact that he spent some of that time in a facility that

227. Id. at 3.
228. Id. at 4.
229. Attachment 1 to Exhibit A at 353, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69 (W.D.N.Y.), order
vacated, appeal dismissed, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 17-2 (Hassoun’s
Written Response to Factual Basis and Refusal of Interview).
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monitored all of his communications.230 Finally, it was clear that at least
some of what Hassoun was accused of doing could provide the basis for
criminal charges or, at the very least, would violate the terms of his
supervised release. Yet, the government did not move to indict him or to
revoke his supervised release.231
Still, the allegations were serious and raised the stakes of Hassoun’s
detention. Over the next fifteen months, the veracity of these statements,
what precisely the government needed to do to prove them, and whether
the Constitution allowed the government to detain Hassoun at all would
be litigated in a second habeas petition that Hassoun filed shortly after the
government notified him of its decision to continue his detention.232
B. Hassoun’s Second Habeas Petition and Certification
Pursuant to Section 412
Hassoun brought several constitutional and statutory claims in his
second habeas petition.233 He argued that the substantive Due Process
Clause did not allow preventative detention based on a finding of future
dangerousness unless some additional factor, such as mental illness, was
present. The Supreme Court had reaffirmed this principle in Zadvydas,
when it held that the government could not detain non-citizens after a final
order of removal solely because they were dangerous.234 When removal
was likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government could
satisfy the dangerousness-plus test because the government’s interest in
effectuating removal provided an additional justification for the
detention.235 In the Hassoun case, removal had already been deemed not
likely in the reasonably foreseeable future,236 rendering his detention
illegal under Zadvydas, Kansas v. Hendricks, and the other civil
commitment cases.237
Even if the Due Process Clause did permit detention in this
circumstance, Hassoun argued, the procedural Due Process Clause
guaranteed him certain protections that were absent under the regulation
230. Id. at 356.
231. Decision and Order at 36, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370,
ECF No. 256.
232. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 99.
233. Id.
234. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001).
235. Id. at 690.
236. Hassoun v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-586-FPG, 2019 WL 78984, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019).
The Court found that Hassoun’s removal was not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future because
he was a stateless Palestinian and both Lebanon and Israel (which controls the Palestinian territories),
had rejected the U.S. government’s requests to accept Hassoun. Id. at *4.
237. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (“A finding of dangerousness, standing
alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment.”).
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but that the Supreme Court had held were required in other civil
commitment contexts. Namely, he argued that the government had to bear
the burden by clear and convincing evidence238 that he was entitled to a
determination by a neutral decision-maker,239 and that he had a right to see
the evidence against him and to cross-examine the government’s
witnesses.240
Hassoun also argued that the regulation was invalid and ultra vires
based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas. In Zadvydas, the
Court interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to be consistent with the Due
Process Clause by reading it not to authorize indefinite detention. The
Court suggested that a different, more narrowly tailored statute that
permitted indefinite civil detention might pass constitutional muster.241
But Section 1231 was not narrow-tailored, it applied to an extremely broad
category of non-citizens. Because it would raise constitutional concerns if
interpreted to authorize indefinite detention and because there was no
evidence that Congress intended such a result, the Court read a
presumptively reasonable six-month period into the statute.242 At that
point, the government had to prove that removal was likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future to continue detention.
Hassoun argued that Supreme Court’s interpretation was definitive
and that if the statute did not authorize indefinite detention, a regulation
promulgated under the statute could not either.243 Instead, Hassoun argued,
Congress would need to pass a new statute (as it did in Section 412 of the
USA PATRIOT Act) if the government wanted new detention authority.244
The petition also alleged that Hassoun’s detention violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause because the regulation allowed him to be
238. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (clear and convincing standard applies to
civil commitment).
239. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81–
83 (1992).
240. See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 421 (detainee had right to confront witnesses before judge
and jury); Kansas, 521 U.S. at 353 (detention scheme offered “the right to present and cross-examine
witnesses, and the opportunity to review documentary evidence presented by the State”); Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1980) (requiring, before inmate could be transferred to mental hospital,
“[a]n opportunity . . . to present testimony of witnesses by the defense and to confront and crossexamine witnesses called by the state, except upon a finding … of good cause”).
241. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 691 (2001) (“The provision authorizing detention does
not apply narrowly to ‘a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals,’ say suspected terrorists,
but broadly to aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons, including tourist visa
violations.”) (internal citations omitted).
242. Id.
243. Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner’s Amended Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus at 9, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69 (W.D.N.Y.), order vacated, appeal
dismissed, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 14.
244. Id. at 9–16.
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punished twice for the same conduct, and the void for vagueness doctrine
because the terms national security and terrorism were so vague that they
did not give the average person notice of what conduct was penalized by
the regulation.245 Additionally, Hassoun argued that his detention violated
the Fifth Amendment because the regulation allowed discrimination of the
basis of alienage because it permitted the detention of non-citizens in
circumstances in which U.S. citizens would be released.246 In fact,
Hassoun pointed out, his co-defendant, Kifah Jayyousi, had already been
released,247 and Jose Padilla would be released in just a few years.
Finally, Hassoun argued that even if the regulation was
constitutional, he did not meet the three criteria for detention. Hassoun not
only maintained his innocence of what he was convicted of, he
categorically denied that he had made any of the statements attributed to
him in the FBI Memorandum.248
The government’s response to the petition took an extreme view of
executive power to detain non-citizens who it deemed a threat to national
security. It argued that Zadvydas explicitly left open the possibility of
national security detention,249 that the substantive Due Process Clause did
not protect non-citizens from indefinite detention,250 and that in any event,
Hassoun had been provided access to “robust” procedures to guard against
possibility of error.251 These procedures were, according to the
government, the government notifying Hassoun of his continued
detention, the government describing the factual basis of the detention,
Hassoun having the opportunity to sit for an interview at which he could
have plead his case, and that the Secretary being required to review his
determination every six months. The government forcefully argued that
the Court had no role in reviewing the underlying facts of the certification,

245. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 17–18, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No.
19-cv-370, ECF No. 1.
246. Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner’s Amended Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, supra note 243, at 35–38. For analysis of this claim, see Nino Guruli, The
Unreasonableness of the Citizenship Distinction: Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Lessons
from Abroad, U. CHI. ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/02/24/theunreasonableness-of-the-citizenship-distinction-section-412-of-the-usa-patriot-act-and-lessons-fromabroad-by-nino-guruli [https://perma.cc/L379-QT5X].
247. Trial and Terror, INTERCEPT, https://trial-and-terror.theintercept.com/people/3566e001b98a-4de8-8c61-f9e70d99a3b0 [https://perma.cc/QM22-GJJY].
248. Attachment 1 to Exhibit A at 351–57, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv370, ECF No. 17-2.
249. Respondent’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to the Amended Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 12, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370,
ECF No. 17-4.
250. Id. at 15.
251. Id. at 21.
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making the extreme claim that “the agency’s bottom-line factual
conclusion . . . is untouchable.”252
But perhaps the most troubling argument the government made was
that a propensity of terrorism was itself the “special circumstance” that
provided a justification for Hassoun’s detention. This would put Islamic
extremism in the same category as mental illness or pedophilia. In other
words, the government identified Islamic extremism as a “volitional”
factor that meant that individuals who shared this ideology could not
control their behavior, could not be rehabilitated, and could not be deterred
by normal criminal sanctions. These individuals were, in the government’s
eyes, irredeemable and uncontainable. To make its point, the government
invoked the most-oft used quotation in national security matters: “the
constitution is not a suicide pact.”253
Although it is often assumed that terrorists will recidivate at high
levels when they are released from custody, the research does not bear this
out. A study of all individuals convicted of terrorism offenses after 9/11
and subsequently released from custody found a recidivism rate of 1.6%,
much lower than the recidivism rate for other offenders, which is as high
as 66% in the first three years after release.254 Of the four individuals who
recidivated after release, none were accused of terrorism-related crimes:
one violated his plea agreement by using the internet, one committed fraud
by illegally buying food stamps, one was convicted of forgery, and the last
was convicted of a drug offense.255 Another study of international jihadists
found a recidivism rate of 1%.256
Moreover, the government has not sought to indefinitely detain other
offenders convicted of political crimes, including eco-terrorists, White
Supremacists, or the Weather Underground. The same justification—that
people convicted of ideological or political crimes cannot control their
behavior—would apply to these groups as well, but the government has
not tried to use it to prolong criminal sentences in those cases. In other
words, the government has declared that a particular ideology is more
dangerous than any other extremist belief, even when the evidence
suggests that the government’s central contention about this ideology—
that followers recidivate at higher rates—is false.
What really underlies this argument is Islamophobia. Islamophobia
causes government actors to believe that anyone even remotely associated
252. Id. at 39.
253. Hassoun v. Searls, Case No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 17-4.
254. Omi Hodwitz, The Terrorism Recidivism Study (TRS): Examining Recidivism Rates for
Post-9/11 Offenders, 13 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 54, 54, 56 (2019).
255. Id. at 60.
256. Christopher Wright, An Examination of Jihadi Recidivism Rates in the United States, 12
CTC SENTINEL 26, 27 (2019).
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with Islamic extremism is uniquely dangerous. Fear of Muslims, together
with government attempts to capitalize on that fear, is what causes the
firmly held belief that a Muslim “terrorist” can never be rehabilitated and
should never be released. The government in Hassoun’s case asked the
court to approve of this problematic view by exempting individuals
convicted of terrorism-related crimes from the normal protections of due
process.
C. Hassoun’s Section 412 Evidentiary Hearing
Shortly after briefing was complete on the regulation, the
government moved to invoke Section 412 as an alternate detention
authority, certifying Hassoun under both the regulation and Section 412.257
According to the government, because Section 412 had no notice
requirement, it was not required to inform Hassoun that it would be
invoked until after the certification process was complete. Now the
government needed to win on only one of its two authorities in order to
detain Hassoun indefinitely.
In December 2019, the district judge issued a decision on both the
regulation and Section 412. On the regulation, Judge Wolford agreed with
Hassoun that the regulation was ultra vires and invalid, in part because it
lacked basic procedural protections.258 On Section 412, however, Judge
Wolford decided to defer deciding the constitutional issues until after an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the certification.259 In a subsequent
decision, Judge Wolford held that the government would have the burden
of showing by clear and convincing evidence that Hassoun met the
statutory requirements for Section 412 detention.260 Judge Wolford further
determined that the government could, consistent with the practice of the
D.C. District Courts in the Guantanamo cases, present hearsay evidence to
make its case, but that the hearsay had to be reliable and non-hearsay
evidence had to be unavailable.261 Judge Wolford allowed both parties to
take discovery, and set a date for the evidentiary hearing.
The government could have sought an interlocutory appeal of this
decision, but it did not. Instead, the government acquiesced to a relatively
short period of discovery, made slightly longer because of the delay due
to the coronavirus pandemic. At first, the government resisted providing
257. Respondent’s Notice of Secretarial Certification of Continued Detention and Consent
Motion for Supplemental Briefing, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69 (W.D.N.Y.), order vacated,
appeal dismissed, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 26.
258. Hassoun v. Searls, 427 F. Supp. 3d 357, 372 (W.D.N.Y. 2019).
259. Id. at 373.
260. Decision and Order at 9, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370,
ECF No. 75.
261. Id. at 17.
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Hassoun’s legal team with the identity of the informants whose allegations
formed the basis of the FBI Memorandum. When the judge made clear
that they could not rely on the hearsay testimony of informants unless the
government disclosed their identities to Hassoun, the government
grudgingly disclosed the informants’ identities, together with over 10,000
pages of discovery.262
Through a review of these documents, the investigation into Hassoun
began to come in to focus. It had started shortly after Hassoun arrived at
the facility when a detainee reported having an argument with Hassoun
during which they argued over a terrorist attack in Spain. According to this
detainee, Ahmad Hamed, Hassoun had stated support for the terrorist
attack and for al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS.263 When Hamed allegedly
disagreed, Hamed reported Hassoun saying “you deserve to die with
them,” which the FBI had interpreted to mean that Hamed should die along
with the American victims of the terrorist attacks. Hamed reported this
conversation and an agent from the Buffalo Joint Terrorism Task Force
interviewed him. A second detainee, Ahmed Abdelraouf, was present
during the argument, but was not interviewed before he was released from
custody. Hamed was deported shortly after his report.
In early 2018, a second detainee, Mohamed Hirsi, complained to the
facility’s chaplain about the content of Hassoun’s religious sermons.264
The chaplain talked to Hassoun and told him to stop using “incendiary
rhetoric.” Hassoun agreed.265
At this point, it is unclear whether DHS had formally opened an
investigation into Hassoun, but investigators do not appear to have taken
any further investigative steps. Then, in May 2018, there was a
breakthrough. Shane Ramsundar, a detainee from Trinidad and Tobago,
wrote a message to facility staff claiming he had information about
Hassoun recruiting for ISIS and planning terrorist attacks in the facility.266
Over the next several months, Ramsundar recounted increasingly
fantastical stories, alleging that Hassoun had terrorist contacts in Africa,
that he was supposedly plotting attacks on port in South Florida where
“ships traveling from Trinidad and Tobago transfer ‘liquid nitrile gas’”

262. Decision and Order at 9–10, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF
No. 225.
263. Exhibit 14, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 248-14 (FBI
302 of Ahmed Hamed).
264. Exhibit 11, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 248-11
(Intelligence Report).
265. Second Hassoun Dec., supra note 31, ¶ 20.
266. Record of FBI Interview with Shane Ramsundar, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69,
No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 263-14.
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and that he was communicating with a terrorist recruiter named “Faroud
Abubaker” who was “a recruiter for ISIS in Trinidad and Tobago.”267
The Joint Terrorism Task Force apparently did not find it strange that
Hassoun, a stateless Palestinian from Lebanon, would be planning an
attack with a terrorist group from Trinidad and Tobago, where Hassoun
had no connections but which was Ramsundar’s country of origin. Nor did
they seem concerned when they were unable to corroborate elements of
Ramsundar’s story. For example, after Ramsundar told agents that
Hassoun was speaking to contacts on the phone,268 the facility listened to
months’ worth of Hassoun’s recorded phone calls and found nothing.
As the investigation into Hassoun began ramping up, a few other
reports trickled in. In November 2018, ICE received an anonymous letter
alleging that he had overheard Hassoun speaking with another detainee
about how to build an explosive. The anonymous informant was identified
a few months later as Hector Rivas Merino, a detainee from El Salvador
and a converted Muslim who attended services.269 Another detainee,
Abbas Raza, reported in January 2019 that Hassoun had said that civilian
deaths on 9/11 were just a casualty of war, and that Hassoun had “pledged
support for ISIS.”270 Oddly, although investigators were clearly interested
in the stories of Rivas Merino and Raza, they did not take statements from
them. Abbas Raza was never formally interviewed by the FBI and Rivas
Merino’s testimony was never preserved in a declaration or deposition
even when investigators knew he would be deported from the United
States.271
When the FBI was called upon to write the Letterhead Memorandum
that would serve as the basis for Hassoun’s indefinite detention, it was
these reports from fellow detainees that it used to make the case that
Hassoun was dangerous.
Hassoun denied the allegations, but it was difficult to prove that the
conversations did not happen. Still, there were reasons to doubt the
credibility of some of the government’s informants. Ramsundar was
facing deportation after defrauding immigrants in Queens out of $1.75
million by impersonating an ICE agent.272 Hamed had also been convicted
267. Memorandum in Support of Petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions and to Compel Disclosure at
1, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 263-1.
268. Record of FBI Interview with Shane Ramsundar, supra note 266, at 5; FBI Memorandum
Dated February 21, 2019, supra note 62 (no allegation related to phone calls in the facility).
269. Exhibit 6, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 248-6 (FBI 302
of Hector Rivas Merino).
270. Decision and Order, supra note 262, at 31.
271. Id. at 32–33.
272. Kirk Semple, 3 Charged with Stealing $1.75 Million from Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
18, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/nyregion/19fraud.html [https://perma.cc/N6ZYCLU5].
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of fraud, and had disappeared after being deported to Egypt.273 The report
of the interview with Rivas Merino made clear that he was reporting about
a conversation in Arabic, a language that he was not fluent in.274 Moreover,
the FBI had closed the case file after doing an investigation into the
allegation275 and had released the other detainee from custody,
undercutting the FBI’s contention that it took the conversation seriously.276
The only allegation that Hassoun conceded was partly true is that he
had criticized the U.S. government and Israel in some of his sermons, that
it had made some of the other detainees uncomfortable, and that he had
stopped after the chaplain spoke with him.277 He was, by all accounts, an
outspoken person who often shared his political opinions with anyone who
would listen. But neither the chaplain, nor the detainee who made the
complaint, alleged that Hassoun was making violent threats during the
sermons.
The question for Hassoun’s legal team was why the other informants
were lying. The government maintained that none of the informants had
sought or received any benefit for their cooperation.278 And it was multiple
informants who had accused Hassoun of supporting terrorist
organizations, which meant that Hassoun would need to show that each
had a motive for lying.
As the case proceeded towards discovery, several developments
occurred. First, the government tracked down Abdulraouf and recorded an
interview with him. Abdulraouf had a very different memory of the
argument between Hamed and Hassoun. In his retelling, there was no
mention of specific terrorist attacks or ISIS, nor did he remember Hassoun
saying that Hamed should die with the Americans. According to
Abdulraouf, the argument was a dispute about a religious text and whether
the Koran allowed the killing of innocent women and children to advance
religious causes.279
Second, at a Muslim service in February, Hassoun stood up and
warned the other detainees not to talk to Ramsundar because he had made
up allegations against Hassoun. Ramsundar reported that he felt
273. Decision and Order at 35, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370,
ECF No. 225.
274. Id. at 23.
275. Exhibit 8, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69 (W.D.N.Y.), order vacated, appeal
dismissed, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 248-8 (FBI Case File).
276. Exhibit 7, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 248-7 (Order
of Supervision for Rami Abuziyad).
277. Second Hassoun Dec., supra note 31, ¶¶ 16–20.
278. Exhibit 3 at 5, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 263-5
(Govt.’s Responses to Pet.’s Requests for Production).
279. Exhibit 10, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 248-10 (FBI
302 of Interview with Ahmed Abdulraouf).
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intimidated by Hassoun’s comments.280 He later wrote a letter accusing
Hassoun of threatening his life when he encountered Ramsundar in the
legal visitation area,281 a charge Hassoun vociferously denied.
On the basis of this violation of the protective order in the case—
Hassoun was not supposed to publicly reveal the names of the
informants—and the alleged threat against Ramsundar, the government
filed a motion for sanctions, accusing Hassoun of witness tampering and
arguing that his habeas petition should be dismissed, or in the alternative,
that Ramsundar’s statements against Hassoun should be admitted to the
record and deemed true.282 According to several other declarations filed
with the motion for sanctions, other detainees were also afraid to testify
for fear that Hassoun would retaliate against them.283 These detainees were
later identified as Mohamed Hirsi, the detainee who had expressed concern
about the content of Hassoun’s religious sermons, and Mohamed Al-Abed,
a one-time friend of Hassoun who had surfaced recently as an additional
witness against Hassoun.284
Then, something almost unbelievable occurred that blew the case
wide open. Through a serendipitous series of events, Hassoun’s legal team
came into possession of a several documents that showed Ramsundar’s
allegations against Hassoun to be false. This caused the government to
abandon him as a witness, and eventually caused the government’s entire
case against Hassoun to collapse.285
1. Motions for Sanctions
The documents in question were in Ramsundar’s A-file, the central
file that the government maintains about each non-citizen. The
government had not disclosed them, even though they were clearly
responsive to Hassoun’s discovery requests. The file included a statement
by Ramsundar, dated one month prior to his first allegations against
Hassoun, in which he detailed his long history of serving as an FBI
informant as a reason why the government should allow him to stay in the

280. Decision and Order, supra note 262, at 18.
281. Id. at 25.
282. Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent’s Motion for Sanctions at 2, Hassoun v.
Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 172.
283. Id. at 23.
284. Petitioner’s Memorandum Regarding Petitioner’s Pending Motion for Sanctions at 8–9,
Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 274 (identifying Al-Abed); Decision
and Order, supra note 231, at 23.
285. Memorandum in Support of Petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions and to Compel Disclosure,
supra note 267, at 2.
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United States.286 In the statement, Ramsundar bragged about developing
and then informing the FBI about a plot almost identical to the one he
accused Hassoun of plotting as a confidential informant in the 2000s. The
statement also contained an admission that Ramsundar had personal and
intimate knowledge of the terrorist organization in Trinidad and Tobago,
including the Abu Bakr family that leads it, with which he accused Mr.
Hassoun of conspiring. In short, the documents strongly suggested that
Ramsundar had recycled and fabricated the allegations against Hassoun.287
The government responded to the Motion for Sanctions by
abandoning Ramsundar as a witness, telling the court that the government
had “concerns about Mr. Ramsundar’s credibility and ability to truthfully
testify,”288 and withdrawing its request that Ramsundar’s allegations be
accepted by the court as true. In response to a court order, the government
also turned over thousands of additional documents about Ramsundar and
the other informants that it had failed to disclose earlier, many of which
were exculpatory for Hassoun.289 For instance, Ramsundar had explicitly
requested relief from deportation in exchange for further information
about Hassoun in a letter to Thomas Feeley, the head of the ICE Buffalo
Field Office, but the letter had not been turned over in the government’s
original disclosures and directly contradicted the government’s assertion
that no informant had sought a benefit for testifying against Hassoun.290
The newly-disclosed documents also cast doubt on one of the
government’s other witnesses who connected Hassoun to ISIS, Abbas
Raza. Raza also had a history of working as an FBI informant and had
previously received relief from deportation for his cooperation. In
addition, Raza’s file had been marked as a special interest case by the FBI,
which suggested that Raza had had previous ties to terrorism and
suggested that he, like Ramsundar, had independent knowledge of the
people and groups that he accused Hassoun of supporting. Finally, Raza
had asked for relief from deportation because of his previous work for the
FBI just a few months before he made his allegations against Hassoun.291
At the same time, the government was facing intense scrutiny from
the Court about misrepresentations to the Court and spoliation of evidence.
286. Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions and to Compel
Disclosure at 7, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 205 [hereinafter
Pet.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Sanctions].
287. Id. at 5–9.
288. Reply in Support of Respondent’s Motion for Sanctions at 2, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F.
Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 180.
289. Pet.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Sanctions, supra note 286, at 6.
290. Id. at 7.
291. Petitioner’s Supplemental Objections to Respondent’s Pre-Hearing Memorandum,
Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 212.
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After Ramsundar had alleged that Hassoun had threatened him, Hassoun’s
legal counsel requested that the facility provide the surveillance videos of
the area on the day in question. As it turned out, the government had
already viewed the videotape, determined that it did not support
Ramsundar’s allegation, and then allowed the video to be deleted.292 In
addition, the government had reviewed movement logs from the day
Ramsundar said the threat occurred and found that neither Hassoun nor
Ramsundar had visited the legal visitation area that day.293
Yet, despite the fact that its independent investigation had proven the
allegation false, it did not withdraw the allegation and continued to press
it in court. In response to allegations that it had destroyed evidence, the
government argued that there was no reason to keep the videotape because
it did not show anything,294 which seemed to suggest that the only evidence
that the government had a duty to preserve was evidence that supported its
position.
Other misrepresentations to the court also emerged. While the
government’s attorneys argued in court that Al Abed was afraid to testify
against Hassoun, contemporaneous emails to those same attorneys made
clear that Al-Abed was willing to testify, but that he wanted a benefit for
it.295 The government failed to disclose those emails until after Hassoun’s
attorneys had contacted Al Abed.
The court also threw out much of the hearsay that the government
sought to introduce, including the statements of Hector Rivas Merino and
Abbas Raza. For Rivas Merino’s statement, the court found that there was
no evidence to suggest Rivas Merino even understood the conversation he
reported, and the fact that the FBI subsequently closed the investigation
seriously undercut its probative value.296 The court rejected Abbas Raza’s
statements because of the significant questions about his credibility and
the fact that he had sought relief from deportation for informing on
Hassoun,297 and the fact that he only came forward after the government
had been searching for additional evidence to hold Hassoun for months.
Moreover, the court faulted the government for not preserving Rivas
Merino’s and Raza’s testimony before they were deported. The court
allowed the government to present the hearsay statement of Ahmed
Hamed, and ruled that Abdulraouf had to testify from Egypt.298
292. Pet.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Sanctions, supra note 286, at 4.
293. Id. at 26.
294. Id. at 4.
295. Petitioner’s Memorandum Regarding Petitioner’s Pending Motion for Sanctions, supra
note 285, at 9–10.
296. Decision and Order, supra note 262, at 29.
297. Id. at 31.
298. Id. at 28, 34–35.
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That left the government with four witnesses: Ahmed Abdulraouf,
Ahmed Hamed, Mohamed Al-Abed, and Mohamed Hirsi. Of these
witnesses, only Hamed—the one hearsay witness—said Hassoun had
supported ISIS. That account was disputed by Abdulraouf, who said only
that Hassoun supported an interpretation of the Koran that allowed for
violence against civilians (which Hassoun still denied).299 Al Abed also
denied the Hassoun had ever expressed support for any terrorist group or
supported ISIS. In the report of his FBI interview, Al Abed stated only that
Hassoun had made statements against Israel.300 Mohamed Hirsi likewise
did not accuse Hassoun of supporting or recruiting for terrorist groups, just
that he had made anti-American statements in his sermons.301 The
government’s case had been whittled down to a few anti-American or antiIsrael statements and a dispute about the meaning of a religious text.
In a last ditch effort to resuscitate its case, the government attempted
to add several witnesses that it had known about for months but had failed
to include on its witness list, presumably because their statements were
utterly implausible and were clearly designed to curry favor with
deportation officials.302 The court denied the government’s motion as
untimely and because the government identified no reason it could not
have identified the witnesses sooner.303 The government then filed a new
FBI Memorandum with the Ramsundar allegations removed,304 filed a
motion to cancel the evidentiary hearing, and urged the Court to deny the
petition based on the new FBI Memorandum. During a hearing on the
motion, the government conceded that it could not even meet its burden of
proving that Hassoun was dangerous by even a preponderance of the
evidence.
Despite the fact that the government had abandoned its case, it sought
a stay of Hassoun’s release pending appeal on the grounds that an appellate
court could conclude that the government had no burden to meet at all.305
The court denied the stay. In a forty-three page opinion, the court wrote
that:

299. Decision and Order, supra note 231, at 22–23.
300. Id. at 23–24; Exhibit 9, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69 (W.D.N.Y.), order vacated,
appeal dismissed, 976 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2020), No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 248-9 (FBI 302 of Mohamed
Al Abed).
301. Decision and Order, supra note 231, at 23.
302. Decision and Order, supra note 262, at 36–40.
303. Id. at 39–40.
304. Exhibit A at 6, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 261-2 (FBI
Memorandum Dated June 5, 2020).
305. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Stay,
Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF No. 242-1.
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Distilled to its core, Respondent’s position is that he should be able
to detain Petitioner indefinitely based on the executive branch’s sayso, and that decision is insulated from any meaningful review by the
judiciary. The record in this case demonstrates firsthand the danger
of adopting Respondent’s position. Respondent’s position cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny.306

The Court conceded that on their face, the allegations in the FBI
Memo “paint a serious and disturbing picture regarding Petitioner’s
alleged dangerousness.”307 But, the Court continued, these allegations
“cannot bear meaningful scrutiny.”308 The Court agreed with Petitioner
that “there is substantial evidence that Ramsundar . . . completely
fabricated the allegations against Petitioner . . . yet it was not until it was
independently obtained by Petitioner’s counsel that the government
apparently performed any meaningful assessment of Ramsundar’s
credibility.”309 The other allegations, the court concluded, “fare little better
upon inspection” for the reasons Hassoun argued.310 In short, the court
found the Memorandum to be:
[A]n amalgamation of unsworn, uninvestigated, and now largely
discredited statements by jailhouse informants, presented as fact.
Respondent’s position, of which he will have to persuade an appellate
court, is that it is constitutionally permissible to detain Petitioner for
the rest of his life on the basis of this document, without any
opportunity for a habeas court (or any other neutral decisionmaker)
to test its claims.311

The court thus concluded that the government had not come even
remotely close to proving that Hassoun was a danger to national security:
“Far from demonstrating that Petitioner is so dangerous that he must be
detained, the [FBI Memos] illustrate[] a more potent danger—the danger
of conditioning an individual’s liberty on unreviewable administrative
factfinding.”312 The court ordered Hassoun’s release, but gave the
government a short stay to seek a longer stay from an appellate court.
D. The Government’s Post-Judgment Actions
When the government understood that Hassoun was on the verge of
being released, it took quick action to try to prevent it. It immediately filed
306. Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 82.
307. Id. at 84.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 84–85.
310. Id. at 85.
311. Id. at 86.
312. Id. at 91.
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two notices of appeal and motions for a stay of release—one in the D.C.
Circuit, which had jurisdiction over the Section 412 claim, and the Second
Circuit, which the government argued had jurisdiction over the claim on
the regulation.313
It also renewed its efforts to find a country that would accept
Hassoun, and a few days after it had filed its motions for a stay in the
courts of appeals, it found one. On July 13, 2020, it filed in both courts
announcing that it had reached an agreement with an unidentified
country—later identified as Rwanda—to receive Hassoun and that they
expected him to be removed by July 27, 2020.314 It sought an
administrative stay in both courts until after Hassoun was removed.
Hassoun was removed on July 24 and welcomed to Rwanda.315 When
the government of Rwanda announced that it had accepted Hassoun for
resettlement, the Rwandan press portrayed him very differently than the
U.S. government had:
Despite the “terrorism” charges, Hassoun was not found to be violent.
He was not found guilty of engaging in terrorism activities. Analysts
say his conviction was part of the hysteria in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11, as the U.S government moved to apprehend and bring to
justice all individuals with suspected links to terrorists.316

Rwanda cited the 1954 Convention of the Status of Stateless Persons
in its announcement and called the resettlement “humanitarian.”317
Commentators framed the generous terms of the resettlement as an
expression of Rwanda’s values and history. “[M]any Rwandans were
hosted in many countries and some still have dark memories of
mistreatment and suffering,” one editorial wrote.318 “It only makes sense
for it to spare its wards from the same fate.”319
That might have been the end of the case, except for an unusual move
by the Second Circuit. Even though the government had asked for an
administrative stay, the court granted a stay pending appeal, and issued a

313. See Hassoun v. Searls, No. 20-5191 (D.C. Cir.); Hassoun v. Searls, No. 20-2056 (2d Cir.).
314. Hassoun v. Searls, No. 20-5191, Dkt. 1851292 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2020); Hassoun v. Searls,
No. 20-2056, Dkt. 43 (2d Cir. July 13, 2020).
315. Edmund Kagire, How Rwanda Offered to Take in Stateless Amin Hassoun, KT TIMES (July
25, 2020), https://www.ktpress.rw/2020/07/how-rwanda-offered-to-take-in-stateless-amin-hassoun
[https://perma.cc/AF6G-SYQX].
316. Id.
317. Statement on Resettlement of Stateless Person to Rwanda,
https://twitter.com/rbarwanda/status/1286731397630177281 [https://perma.cc/7TWN-EVAH].
318. Editorial, There Is a Reason Why Rwanda Has an Open Door for All Who Suffer, NEW
TIMES (July 25, 2020), https://www.newtimes.co.rw/opinions/editorial-there-reason-why-rwandahas-open-door-all-who-suffer [https://perma.cc/9SF2-TUHA].
319. Id.
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short notice that an opinion would be forthcoming.320 Then, one week after
Hassoun had been removed, it issued an opinion that sharply criticized the
district court’s decisions in the case.321
The Second Circuit found that the government had demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal. It found that the
regulation was not ultra vires and invalid because Zadvydas had left open
the possibility that its ruling might not extend to terrorists and other
specially dangerous individuals.322 It also held that the due process clause
only required that the government prove its allegations by a preponderance
of the evidence and that there was no need for a neutral decisionmaker
because there was habeas review.323
The Second Circuit did not address the fact that the government’s
case had collapsed, that most of its allegations had been proven false or
discredited, or that the government had conceded that it could not even
meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. In other words, there
was no way that the government would succeed on the merits even if it
had won on the legal issues identified by the court.324
It is unclear what would have happened next if Hassoun had not
already gained his freedom. Presumably, he would have sat in detention
for a year or more while the appeal was being decided. Then, after the
same panel issued an opinion likely to be similar to the one it issued on the
motion to stay, the case would be remanded to the district court. At that
point, unless the government was able to conjure up new evidence, it
would lose again, probably prompting another appeal. The case could have
dragged on for several more years with Hassoun sitting in detention.
It is also unclear why the court felt the need to opine on such
important issues of constitutional law on a motion to stay the release of an
individual who was no longer in custody in an appeal that was already
moot and would never be heard. But, in a later opinion rejecting Hassoun’s
request to have the opinion vacated, the court did not explain why it had
reached out and decided the issues unnecessarily, declaring only that the
case was not technically moot at the time it granted the stay and that
therefore, issuing the decision was not improper.325
320. Hassoun v. Searls, No. 20-2056, Dkt. 60 (2d Cir. July 16, 2020).
321. Hassoun v. Searls, 968 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2020).
322. Id. at 200.
323. Id. at 201–02.
324. In a footnote, the Court suggested that it would not violate due process even if the judicial
review of the certification under the regulation did not include review of the factual predicate,
suggesting that perhaps the government could win on remand because the court would be unable to
review the underlying factual allegations. However, the court also noted that it did not believe that
review was so limited. Id. at 201 n.2.
325. Hassoun v. Searls, 976 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2020).
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The Second Circuit also vacated the district judge’s decision on the
regulation under United States v. Munsingwear,326 which held that vacatur
of a lower court opinion is proper when the case is mooted out unless the
losing party is responsible for the appeal becoming moot. The court
reasoned that the timing of Hassoun’s removal was happenstance and that
the government had been trying to remove him the entire time.327
Now that the regulation has been declared valid by the Second
Circuit—even if it was less than fully precedential because it was an
opinion on a preliminary motion—the next person in Hassoun’s position
will likely face greater odds in challenging his detention. This will give
the government valuable time to come up with a Plan B if the detention is
eventually struck down.
V. ANALYSIS
What lessons can we draw from Hassoun’s case? Fundamentally,
cases like Hassoun’s remind us why we have due process protections in
the first place. There are cases where parties warn that if the executive
branch is given unreviewable authority, it will abuse that power. This case
proves these warnings right. It was the procedural protections the court
granted to Hassoun that allowed him to challenge the government’s case
against him—and win. With the Supreme Court poised to pull back on the
protections due process affords to non-citizens,328 this is an important take
away.
There will be some for whom Hassoun’s case will prove the
opposite—that we cannot provide due process when national security is at
stake because dangerous people might be ordered released. But this
perspective assumes that he is dangerous. I hope I have provided you
enough information to have some doubt about whether Hassoun was ever
dangerous, let alone that he is dangerous today. And yet, if you had read
the newspaper articles about him, or the government’s depiction of him,
you would have come away convinced that the government was correct.
Avoiding erroneous deprivations is the paradigmatic purpose of the
procedural Due Process Clause.
Another notable aspect of Hassoun’s case was the way the
government used overlapping legal authorities to detain him for almost
two decades. At each step, Hassoun had to fight his detention, and even
when he won, he lost. He was moved to criminal custody just at the point
that the government lost its authority to hold him in immigration detention.
326. 340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950).
327. Hassoun v. Searls, 976 F.3d at 132.
328. Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S.Ct. 1959, 1963–64 (2020)
(limiting due process rights to some non-citizens arrested near the border).

2022]

Domestic National Security Detention

583

He fought back a life sentence only to have the government try again in
the civil context after he served his sentence. He won his first habeas just
to have the government invoke another authority. By the time a court
found that authority unlawful, it had invoked yet another. It was not until
the government ran out of options did it find a country to accept him. The
government claims this timing was coincidental, but it beggars belief that
the government would have expended diplomatic (and possibility
financial) resources finding Hassoun a country when it could just hold him
forever under Section 412.
The more detention authorities proliferate, the more tools the
government has to skirt constitutional rules. Even if the procedural
protections under each authority are robust—which, as discussed, they
often are not—the legal system moves slowly enough that it won’t matter.
Hassoun’s second habeas action proceeded at breakneck pace, and yet it
took fifteen months for the judge to order him released. That could easily
stretch to years in other cases. In order to prevent this gaming of the
system, courts must look at how detention authorities are used sequentially
to prolong an individual’s detention and not evaluate each authority
separately.
Hassoun’s case also provides a good opportunity to reevaluate the
special deference we give to the government in matters related to national
security and immigration. Indeed, there may be reasons to think that less
deference should be given in these areas because of the unique
vulnerabilities non-citizens face and the unique incentives the government
has. The political consequences the government risks when releasing a
dangerous person are grave, and the incentives weigh strongly in favor of
keeping people detained. Law enforcement officers—like all of us—have
implicit and explicit biases that predispose them to certain stereotypes or
prejudices about immigrants in general or Muslims in particular.
These biases are layered on top of the cognitive biases that human
beings experience in any situation they encounter, including confirmation
bias (the tendency to seek out information that confirms what you already
believe) and anchoring bias (the tendency to rely most heavily on the first
piece of information you receive about someone and filter all new
information through that lens). These biases can infect any law
enforcement investigation. The Innocence Project has documented
hundreds of cases where police and prosecutors were laser focused on a
single suspect, disregarding all evidence to the contrary.329 As Emily
Bazelon has explained:

329. See EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED 225 (2019).
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Exonerations tend to expose bad police work . . . .They also reveal
prosecutors blinded by tunnel vision and breaking the rules to nail
down a conviction. Chillingly, prosecutors may be more likely to
withhold evidence when proof of guilty is uncertain. If you think the
suspect did it but you don’t quite have the goods to convict, you may
be tempted to put a thumb on the scale.330

Many of these factors were present in the investigation into Hassoun.
The investigation was handled poorly from beginning to end. Ramsundar’s
allegations confirmed what the investigators probably already believed
about the person convicted as the co-conspirator of the “dirty bomber.”
When additional informants began to come forward, the
investigators missed clear signs that their informants were telling them
what they wanted to hear.331 Hassoun’s criminal conviction was well
known by other detainees at the facility. Hassoun was an obvious target
for individuals who were hoping to avoid deportation. He also may have
been made a victim of the same prejudices that influenced the
investigators. A Middle Eastern Muslim imam making statements
criticizing the U.S. government resonates differently that a white nonMuslim making the same comments.
Prosecutors often use jailhouse informants to get a guilty verdict,
even though the practice is ethically dubious.332 As Judge Stephen Trott
argued:
The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims
another prisoner has confessed to him. The snitch now stands ready
to testify in return for some consideration in his own case. Sometimes
these snitches tell the truth, but more often they invent testimony and
stray details out of the air.333

In fact, research shows that prosecutor’s use of jailhouse informants is
“strongly correlated with allegations or findings of official misconduct.”334
There is reason to believe that jailhouse informants are even less
reliable in the immigration context than they are in the criminal justice
system. Immigrant detainees know that ICE retains ultimate discretion
about whether they are deported. A single ICE officer can decide to release
330. Id.
331. See Exhibit 10, Hassoun v. Searls, 469 F. Supp. 3d 69, No. 19-cv-370, ECF. No. 248-10
(FBI 302 of Interview with Ahmed Abdulraouf).
332. Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of
Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413,
1419–20 (2007).
333. Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals As Witnesses, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996).
334. Russell D. Covey, Suspect Evidence and Coalmine Canaries, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537,
539 (2018).
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a detainee on an order of supervision, effectively nullifying the removal
order. And the consequences of being deported are often very dire—
detainees risk being separated from families, losing jobs and communities,
and sometimes fear being persecuted in their home countries. This all
creates enormous incentives for immigrant detainees to lie to law
enforcement.
In addition, the consequences of lying are probably lower in the
immigration context. A pre-trial detainee might risk an even longer
criminal sentence if he lies to law enforcement and gets caught. Although
an immigrant detainee could theoretically get prosecuted for perjury, more
likely he will just be deported—the very outcome he seeks to avoid by
becoming a jailhouse informant.
Finally, I believe that the government never expected to have to
prove its allegations against Hassoun, assuming the court would find that
he could be detained based on the government’s say-so. This is not
surprising. ICE is not used to subjecting its allegations to searching
judicial review. In immigration court, asserting something to be true in a
declaration is often enough. Law enforcement is even more likely to cut
corners when there is no judge and no jury checking their work, such as
when courts give deference to the government in matters related to
immigration and national security. 335
Thus, Hassoun existed in a liminal space where he had fewer rights
than criminal defendants or civil detainees in other contexts and was more
at risk for an erroneous deprivation of liberty because of the context in
which he found himself and his history as a “convicted terrorist.” He was
uniquely vulnerable, and as such, needed the extra protections the Due
Process Clause provided him.
Given how far off the rails the government’s case against Hassoun
went, we should also ask the question of whether national security
detention should be permitted at all, even if the Constitution is interpreted
to allow it. Although it may not be possible to draw a conclusion based on
a single case, the post-9/11 experience with national security detention,
when viewed as a whole, is not promising. Many, if not most, of the
individuals detained at Guantanamo as enemy combatants turned out to be
innocent.336 In one horrifying example, Chinese Uighurs captured in
Afghanistan were detained at Guantanamo at the urging of the Chinese
335. Hawaii v. Trump, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018) (“[A] searching inquiry into the
persuasiveness of the President’s justifications is inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the
deference traditionally accorded the President in this sphere.”).
336. Most Guantanamo Detainees are Innocent: Ex-Bush Official, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 19,
2009), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/most-guantanamo-detainees-are-innocent-ex-bush-official1.804550 [https://perma.cc/FFU8-J477].
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government.337 It was later determined that they were political refugees
and had never taken up arms against the United States.338 Other “enemy
combatants,” such as Padilla and Al-Marri, were successfully prosecuted
criminally, negating any need for a new kind of national security detention.
Hassoun’s case should likewise give us pause as to whether government
really needed to bend and stretch the Constitution to detain him.
CONCLUSION
On January 20, 2021, Hassoun messaged me from Rwanda. He had
watched the inauguration of Joe Biden on television and had been moved
by the fireworks display behind the Washington Monument. He was
hopeful about the future of America. It reminded me of what he said about
the country he had called home for thirty years in his statement to the court:
I admire and appreciate your country. There are many people here
who I have great respect for and have an overwhelming gratitude for
their support during my ordeal. I have lived a peaceful life; I was able
to do what I love most, to help people. There is no greater pleasure
than extending a hand of help to those who need it. The United States
is a pioneer in doing that and I love and respect the country for that.339

Hassoun now has a new home, but I hope his experience will not be
in vain. That is up to us.

337. Richard Bernstein, When China Convinced the U.S. That Uighurs Were Waging Jihad, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/us-uighursguantanamo-china-terror/584107 [https://perma.cc/8CNE-7YCN].
338. Id.; Josh White, Lawyers Demand Release of Chinese Muslims, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2006),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/04/AR2006120401191.html
[https://perma.cc/S9HR-DHL4].
339. Second Hassoun Dec., supra note 31, ¶ 31.

